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**Soviet Committee for European Security:
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SOTRUDNICHESTVO: INFORMATSIONNYY
BYULLETEN in Russian No 42-43, Aug 87 pp 31-34

[Text]

Chronicle

—17-25 August 1986: a delegation of prominent representatives of the Free Democratic Party (FRG) headed by Bundestag Deputy O. Feldman visited the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

—8-14 September 1986: political advisers J.M. Virsma and V.J. van den Boomen from the Central Administration of the Labor Party of the Netherlands visited the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

—22-24 September 1986: the 10th session of the working group "Economic East-West Interrelationships in Europe" dedicated to the theme "Process of Decision-Making and Formulation of Policy in the Economy at the Macro and Micro-Levels" was held in Florence (Italy). The session was organized by the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, the Italian Association for the Comparative Study of Economic Systems and the International Research Foundation in Florence. Scientists and representatives of business circles from 13 countries took part in the meeting. Academician O.T. Bogomolov, deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation and director of the Economics of the World Socialist System Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, participated in the session.

—24-28 September 1986: a delegation of the "Alerdink Foundation" (the Netherlands) headed by foundation president Franz Lurfink visited Moscow. The delegation took part in a meeting of managers of the mass media of the East and West.

—26 September-3 October 1986: a delegation of the Italian organization "Disarmament Archives" headed by Senator Luigi Anderlini visited the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

—15-17 September 1986: The International Conference on European Security Problems organized by the Hamburg International Institute for Politics and Economics was held in Hamburg (FRG). A delegation from the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation composed of V.B. Lomeyko, special ambassador of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Maj Gen G.V. Batenin, expert in the USSR Ministry of Defense; and YU.V. Andreyev, deputy director of the Center for West

European Studies of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, took part in the conference.

—4-5 November 1986: while visiting Finland, a delegation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation headed by L.N. Tolkunov, chairman of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, held meetings and talks with leaders of the Finnish National Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

—11-14 November 1986: a delegation of the leadership of the "Greens" Party of the FRG visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation: A.M. Borgman, cochairman of the parliamentary group of the "Greens" in the Bundestag and deputy to the Bundestag; J. Dittfurt and L. Beckman, cochairmen of the managing board of the "Greens" Party; N. Kostede, member of the managing board of the "Greens" Party; O. Scheely, expert in the parliamentary group of the "Greens" Party; and F. Stenner, "Greens" Party expert on matters involving the press.

The delegation was received by A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze; A.F. Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; and N.F. Lukonin, USSR Minister for Nuclear Power.

There were meetings and talks in the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, the association Tekhsnabeksport, the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace.

The delegation held press conferences in Moscow and Bonn on the results of its visit in the USSR.

—30 November-6 December 1986: a delegation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation visited the GDR at the invitation of the National Committee for European Security and Cooperation. It was composed of V.D. Yezhov, sector head of the Marxism-Leninism Institute under the CPSU Central Committee; V.N. Shenayev, director of the Center for West European Studies of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; A.M. Kokev, senior researcher of the World Economics and International Trade Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; and committee secretary G.P. Baranovskiy.

—8-15 February 1987: representatives of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation A.Ya. Sukharev, president of the Association of Soviet Jurists and Minister of Justice of the RSFSR, and Prof T.F. Tairov, acting sector head of the World Economics

and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, met in Vienna (Austria) with representatives of delegations from the countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

—19-24 February 1987: an international symposium was held in West Berlin, in which a delegation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation composed of Ye. Ye. Grigoryev, deputy to the chief editor of the newspaper PRAVDA, and Yu. V. Andreyev, deputy director of the Center for West European Studies of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, took part.

—Representatives of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, A. Ya. Sukharev, president of the Association of Soviet Jurists and Minister of Justice of the RSFSR, and Prof. T. F. Tairov, acting sector head of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, took part in the 43rd Session of the UN Human Rights Commission (Geneva, Switzerland).

—18-21 March 1987: a "round table meeting" organized by the Rhine-Westphalia Foreign Society was held in Dortmund. Participating in the meeting held under the motto "Europe on the Threshold of the Third Millennium: Stopping the Destruction of Nature" were representatives of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, secretaries of the board of the USSR Union of Writers F. F. Kuznetsov and A. A. Mikhaylov, writers T. A. Kudryavtseva and V. F. Ognev, and Central Television reviewer G. I. Zubkov.

—25 March-2 April 1987: a delegation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation composed of F. M. Burlatskiy, political observer for LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, committee secretary Ye. M. Yuryev, and V. P. Gayduk, scientific associate of the General History Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, participated in the Italian-Soviet meeting of representatives of culture, science and the public on the subject "Peace on the Threshold of the 21st Century." The delegation was received by Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Andreotti and there were meetings and talks with members of the leadership of the Christian Democratic Party G. Orlando, head of the international section of the Christian Democratic Party, and A. Kabraso, director of the newspaper POPOLO.

—7-9 April 1987: Dr. of Historical Sciences L. S. Voronkov, representative of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation and leading researcher of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, took part as an observer in the work of the regular congress of the Socialist Left Party of Norway held in Oslo.

—20-25 April 1987: a delegation of the leadership of the Movement of Leftwing Radicals of France headed by movement chairman Senator Francois Duben visited the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

—3-9 May 1987: V. S. Vinogradov, member of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation and department head at Moscow State University imeni Lomonosov, took part in a "round table" meeting on problems of security in Europe held in Madrid (Spain).

—11 May 1987: the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation received representatives of the Christian People's Party of Norway headed by the chairman of its parliamentary group H. Syunnes.

—15-17 May 1987: Prof. D. G. Tomashevskiy, representative of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation and leading researcher of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, participated in the congress of the organization "Alliance for Peace" of the Province of Quebec held in Montreal (Canada).

—15 May 1987: the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation talked with a delegation of the leadership of Socialist Youth of Austria headed by its chairman Peter Kaiser. The delegation visited Moscow at the invitation of the Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR.

—22-24 May 1987: an international conference on problems of international security and confidence-building measures was held in Lokkum (FRG). Representatives of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation participated in the conference: O. A. Grinevskiy, special ambassador of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Yu. V. Andreyev, deputy director of the Center for West European Studies of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V. Ye. Bashkirov, expert with the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs; V. V. Ivanov, lecturer at the Moscow Spiritual Academy; and committee consultant V. I. Vasilyev.

—24-27 May 1987: a delegation of the Hans Seidel Foundation close to the Christian Social Union (FRG) visited Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation. The delegation was made up of O. Wishau, deputy to the Bavarian land parliament, and D. Schmidt, director of the foundation's International Relations Institute. The guests were received by L. N. Tolkunov, chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation. Meetings and talks were held in the World Economics and International Relations Institute and the United States of American and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in the course of which there was discussion of current questions in international politics in Europe and the world and of ways to strengthen

security, cooperation and confidence on the European continent. The interlocutors demonstrated great interest in different aspects of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR and of the restructuring taking place in the country. They discussed proposals for the further development of dialogue between the Hans Seidel Foundation and the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

—28 May 1987: an international forum on the theme "The Risk of War and Hopes for Peace" was held in Copenhagen (Denmark). Representatives of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation participated in the work of the forum: V.A. Babak, sector head of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, honored actor of the RSFSR Leonid Chizhik, and the bishop of Vladimir and Suzdal.

—28-31 May 1987: an international symposium organized by the West Berlin Political Club for European Cooperation was held in Helsinki (Finland). V.M. Shastitko, deputy director of the Economics of the World Socialist System Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and representative of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, took part in the symposium.

—30-31 May 1987: an international conference on the theme "Relations of World Powers and Their Impact in the Area of the Stability of the Military and Political Balance and Disarmament in Europe" was held in Boston (United States of America). Representatives of the scientific public, diplomats and journalists participated in the conference organized by the West Berlin Political Club for European Cooperation. V.I. Mikhaylov, outside correspondent of the newspaper PRAVDA and representative of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, took part in the conference.

—1-10 June 1987: the inter-university center in Dubrovnik (Yugoslavia) held an international conference and course of study on the theme "Conflicts in the International System: from War to Mutual Understanding." Dr of Historical Sciences A.I. Utkin, leading researcher of the United States and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and representative of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, took part in these measures.

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Yazov Visits GSFG

18010029a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Nov 87 p 1

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "A Meeting With the Fightingmen"]

[Text] Army General D. Yazov, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, visited fightingmen in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

During the meeting with commanders and political workers of units and formations, the Defense Minister enquired about the intensification of the combat training and preparations for the anniversary of Great October, presented valuable gifts to a group of officers for their success in the combat and political training, and announced early promotions in rank.

Army General D. Yazov visited troops in the Motorized Rifle Proskurov, Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Regiment, as well as those of order-bearing communications unit "X." The Defense Minister attended classes for the signalmen in a political training group for warrant officers, after which he talked with the officers and warrant officers about the role of combat traditions in the indoctrination of the fightingmen and reviewed exhibits at the combat glory museum.

During his visit to the units the Defense Minister was accompanied by Army General V. Belikov, Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Colonel General N. Moiseyev, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the GSFG, and Lieutenant General K. Fedorov, Chief of Staff of the GSFG.

11499

Obituary: Lt Gen S. I. Makeyev

18010023d Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Oct 87 p 4

[Text] Lt Gen (Ret) Semen Ilich Makeyev died at age 89 after a serious, protracted illness. A true son of the Communist Party and Soviet people and a participant of the Civil War and Great Patriotic War has departed.

Makeyev was born 29 April 1898 to a peasant family in the village of Inshekov, Yegoryevskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast. He volunteered for the Red Army in 1919 and followed a career up to commander of a large strategic formation. In the postwar period he worked on the USSR Ministry of Defense central staff and held a number of responsible positions.

Makeyev performed his party and official duty with a sense of high responsibility in all posts which the party assigned him. He was distinguished by high efficiency, principle, exactingness toward himself, and sensitiveness and attention toward subordinates.

Makeyev's services were highly regarded by the Communist Party and Soviet state. He was awarded the Order of Lenin, three orders of Red Banner, the Order of Kutuzov 2d Class, two orders of Patriotic War 1st Class, two orders of Red Star and many medals.

The bright memory of Semen Ilich Makeyev, fiery patriot and comrade in arms, will be preserved in our hearts forever.

[Signed] Ye. F. Ivanovskiy, M. D. Popkov, D. A. Grinkevich, Yu. T. Chesnokov, V. V. Litvinov, V. G. Privalov, V. A. Gatsolayev, Yu. A. Andersen, Yu. P. Belkov, V. S. Kuzmichev, B. K. Zhdanovich, A. G. Luzan

6904

Reform: Fulfillment of Socialist Commitments

18010029c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Oct 87 p 1

[Editorial: "Fulfill the Commitments Totally"]

[Text] The training year is ending in the army and navy. The fact that fightingmen in the Armed Forces are going to have to report on the fulfillment of training plans and programs and their socialist commitments in the situation of restructuring, on the eve of the celebration of the 70th anniversary of Great October, lends particular importance to the present, final inspection. To totally accomplish what we have aimed for, to do everything possible to see that the anniversary is celebrated with good end results in the combat and political training and with the strengthening of discipline and order, and to make an important contribution to the improvement of the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces—this is the task on which we must concentrate the efforts of military councils, commanders, staffs, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations today.

The effectiveness of the work performed to accomplish this task depends in great part upon the leaders and organizers of the training and indoctrinational process and on the inspectors. It depends upon how competently the final exercises are conducted and upon the extent to which the competition among the personnel for the achievement of good results in all areas of the combat training is lively, interesting and productive. It is important to organize things in such a way that every serviceman, every subunit, unit and ship clearly see unresolved matters and the weak and vulnerable spots in their training and concentrate their efforts on those sections or elements, striving to see that all of the points contained in the commitments accepted in the competition

are fulfilled. A strict and critical approach to the assessment of what has been accomplished as of now will be a reliable means of combatting complacency and indifference and will make it possible to reach the intended goals.

Highly intense combat training and a striving to fulfill the commitments totally and well are typical in this final phase for personnel in the units and ships which initiated the competition in the branches of the Armed Forces and for most of the other military collectives. This reflects the beneficial influence of the renewal occurring in the Armed Forces and in our entire society, and of the decisive turn toward increased demandingness in all areas and increased responsibility for the assigned job.

This is borne out by, among other things, the results of drills conducted in the motorized rifle regiment in which one of the battalions is commanded by Major A. Prokopyev (Leningrad Military District). Each of them is begun promptly on time, is conducted at a rapid pace and at the proper methodological level, is thoroughly provided with the necessary training facilities and makes it possible to improve the professional training of the personnel. A spirit of creativity, initiative and intolerance of indulgences and simplifications, of stagnation and routine is persistently established in the regiment.

Unfortunately, however, this is not the situation everywhere. In some units and on some ships, in the final phase of the training year there is still no accurate idea of where the personnel are close to fulfilling the competition commitments and where they lag behind, no clear idea of where the main effort needs to be focused right now. In some places there are cases of inefficient use of training time, proper concern is not always shown for providing material support for the training or for the methodological preparation of those in charge, and certain areas of the combat and special training for the personnel are omitted without justification.

The squadron commanded by Major O. Rotyukov in air regiment "X" (Far East Military District) has achieved fairly good results in the summer training. There is still no accurate picture of how what has been achieved by each pilot conforms to what was specified in the commitments, however. With respect to flights with combat application, there is a marked lag in this area. It would seem that this sort of thing would not exist in a regiment which is generally in good standing. Nonetheless, the restructuring of attitudes, of the work style and methods, the organization of the combat training and the competition is proceeding slowly in this squadron.

It is important to do everything possible today to equip the personnel with the accumulated progressive experience, to ensure that the exercises, particularly the final ones, are conducted on a high organizational and methodological level, and to improve the morale of the personnel and their faith that success can be achieved.

The officers unquestionably have the crucial role with respect to improving the effectiveness and quality of the training in the final phase. The final exercises are a serious test for them. They must further strengthen the spirit of creativity and initiative, intolerance of formalism and demandingness of themselves and of their subordinates for the results of their work. During this period it is particularly important to maintain strict regulation order, discipline and organization at the level of contemporary demands and to help each individual to thoroughly understand his responsibility for his personal contribution to the fulfillment of commitments in the competition.

A great deal will also depend upon how skilfully and effectively the competition is organized among the personnel in the final exercises. We must take a close look at what has justified itself and what has proven ineffective, outmoded or obsolete, and see to it that the competition truly becomes a powerful tool for stimulating the human factor, that it focuses on the accomplishment of the tasks facing the unit or subunit and that it helps to solidify the military collectives and develop in the fightingmen good moral qualities, friendship and military comradeship, and the keeping of their word.

Political organs, party and Komsomol organizations have an important role in stimulating the personnel to fulfill the competition commitments and to greet the 70th anniversary of Great October in a worthy manner. Success will depend in great part upon how active the Communists and Komsomol members are and upon the personal example set by each of them in the training and the service. The task is one of promoting with all forms of party and Komsomol work the enhancement of qualitative indices in the training and of ensuring that each fightingman and each military collective reaches the goals which have been set.

A worthy contribution to the enhancement of the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces will be made by making practical and efficient use of each hour in the final phase of the training year, by fulfilling combat and political training plans and programs and the commitments accepted in the competition completely and well.

11499

All-Union Assembly of Young Reservists
18010033a Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Nov 87 p 3

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Kuleshov, Ashkhabad: "A Soldier Is Always a Soldier!"]

[Text] The first All-Union Assembly of Young Reservists is being held in Ashkhabad. Participating in it are more than 1,500 of yesterday's soldiers, seamen, NCOs and petty officers, who have traveled here from the Ukraine,

Uzbekistan, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Armenia and other republics of the nation. Distributed among four battalions, they have begun the training.

The thing one likes the most in these young men in the protective uniform, now civilians, is their initiative and their vigorous desiring to conduct the assembly in such a way that it is the beginning of a qualitatively new youth movement. This is what Sergey Morozov, former Soviet Army sergeant, a participant in the Afghan events and now a brigade leader at the Yuzhnorubnyy plant in Nikopol, deputy in the USSR Supreme Soviet and chief of the assembly, had to say about it:

"One of the objectives of our assembly is to stimulate the military-patriotic movement in Turkmenia and in the nation as a whole. Turkmenistan was chosen for a reason. The military training of the future soldiers is still weak here in Central Asia. To provide assistance and stimulate the military-patriotic movement among the local youth—this is our objective."

The young reservists will take part in fire training, fire the main types of modern weapons, meet with the republic's Komsomol aktiv and visit labor and training collectives.

S.A. Niyazov, First Secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party CC, addressed the assembly participants.

11499

Reservists Conference: Possible Structure Discussed

18010033b Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Nov 87 p 6

[Report by PRAVDA correspondents V. Verstakov and M. Volkov: "they Remain in the Formation: The First All-Union Assembly of Young Reservists Is Continuing Near Ashkhabad"; first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] The opening of the assembly and its first days of work occurred dozens of kilometers from Turkmenia's capital: at two Pioneer country camps and at a military training center. Nor was there the customary formal opening.

S. Niyazov, First Secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party CC, addressed one of the battalions of reservists. He told about problems with the restructuring in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth in the republic.

There were other meetings as well—unplanned and difficult—on Ashkhabad's downtown streets. Also with young reservists, a particularly large number of whom were to be found near the airline and railway ticket offices. They were not assembly participants. They had just been released into the reserve in November. In the airline waiting room we talked with two of them, soldiers

and internationalists: Vladimir Pyshkov, combat engineer and holder of the Red Star order, and Boris Fisenko, a signalman decorated with the Military Valor badge of the Komsomol CC. We asked them where they wanted to fly.

"To any city in Russia," Boris answered. "Wherever the ticket situation is easiest. Those who went before us flew through Tashkent and then warned us by letter that one could 'catch' nothing in Tashkent, that we should try to find a different route."

But let us return to the Ashkhabad assembly. At the discussion center they were discussing the important issue of whether the patriotic movement of young reservists needed a rigid, centralized structure and a general Union charter. A representative of Georgia even read from the speaker's platform a draft charter prepared and tested in the republic. It was applauded furiously from the auditorium, but this made the calm and convinced objections sound even weightier: "Fellows, we are moving toward formalism.... If we separate ourselves from the Great Patriotic War veterans, we won't be worth anything...."

It was following those words that we went up to gray-haired Genrig Viktorovich Akimov, who looked to us like a veteran. No, he did not take part in the Great Patriotic War, but that great war left profound, personal pain in his life. His father was listed as missing in action at the front, and his mother lost a leg in the evacuation. He is now a major in the reserve. He served in Afghanistan and was awarded the Afghan Star order, 3rd degree. At the assembly he represented the Internationalist Club in the city of Andropovo, Yaroslavl oblast.

"What do the veterans usually talk about?" he asked. "How they pounded the fascists. How they reached Berlin. More rarely, about everyday life in the war. Even more rarely, about their life prior to the war. But it was precisely because prior to the war they had jumped from parachutes towers, swum in icy water, worked from daylight to dark and become Voroshilov marksmen that they were able to withstand the pressures of the front, rise out of their snow-covered trenches and drive the enemy away from Moscow. We remember their feats, but for the youth today another area of memory is equally important: to remember and resurrect in the new circumstances the practical preparation of body and spirit for the trials of military service tested by today's veterans...."

The organizers of the Ashkhabad assembly, the young reservists themselves, apparently share this viewpoint. The assembly is taking place under strict and rigid conditions. Life for the battalions is rigorous—even too rigorous, it sometimes seemed to us on the sideline. In the mountains at the training center, where the assembly participants live in tents and where the temperature fluctuates from one side to the other of zero at night, there were no stoves at first.

Yuriy Levin, fightingman, internationalist and holder of the Order of Lenin, greeted us cheerfully, with a smile, in his platoon's tent. He did not get up from his bed, however. He was very tired after a 3-day trip from Moscow in an overcrowded reserve-ticket passenger car. Yuriy and the entire delegation from the capital oblast arrived at the assembly at night and spent the morning trying to get return tickets. We would add to this the fact that Yuriy Levin lost both legs in Afghanistan....

Despite this, the young reservists look upon the current assembly as a long-awaited and happy celebration. The participants say so. There is no disagreement about this. But during the years of difficult military service followed by years of semi-recognition or—there is not point in mincing words when it comes to important matters—lack of recognition of the new military-patriotic movement of the youth, they have simply grown unaccustomed to celebrations. And so, they have come to the Ashkhabad assembly not so much to celebrate as to bring up and try to resolve problems.

11499

Troops Assist in Harvest

Kazakhstan on the Line

18010023c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Sep 87 p 1

[Article by Lt Col S. Petrov under rubric "Soldiers in the Harvest"]

[Text] Military drivers who came as part of motor vehicle subunits to help grain growers of Ordzhonikidzevskiy Rayon, Kustanay Oblast are working fast and well. For example, the names of privates P. Melnik, V. Samsonov and Ye. Zelenskiy, each of whom already has transported 1,500 tons of grain, can be seen on the competition leader board in Ayatskiy Sovkhoz.

The subunit commanded by Officer A. Shirokov is working fast and well in rayon fields.

The personnel took an understanding attitude toward a proposal by the heads of a number of farms to assist in digging potatoes by hand. It was impossible to take in the harvest otherwise: everything was covered with water after abundant rains. Drivers who had no work took shovels in hand and moved out to the potato fields. Komsomol activist Capt A. Aleksandrov headed up work in Batalinskiy Sovkhoz.

6904

Far East on the Line

18010023c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Sep 87 p 1

[Article by Senior Warrant Officer S. Petrov under rubric "Soldiers in the Harvest"] txt

[Text] Protracted rains considerably hampered the harvest of potatoes and other vegetables in the fields of Khabarovsk Kray. That was when heads of the local agro-industrial complex turned for help to far eastern soldiers. Last Sunday hundreds of soldiers moved out into the kray's fields together with kolkhoz members, sovkhoz workers and industrial enterprise workers. Despite heavy rain and gusty wind personnel of subunits commanded by Maj O. Gorodilov, Maj V. Goykhman, Capt V. Klapatyuk and others worked fast and well in the fields. They considerably overfulfilled the established day norms.

6904

Responses to Articles on Pension Abuses

We Have Different Duties

18010023e Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Oct 87 p 2

[Letter by Guards Senior Warrant Officer V. Agapov, Moscow Military District, under general title "Pension Position"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Letters from Sr Lt Yu. Prosandeyev (Northern Fleet Air Force) entitled "Pension Position" were published on 2 September under the rubric "From the Editor's Mailbag." The author announced in particular that prior to completing active military service some warrant officers are appointed to a position in the unit with a higher rate of pay so that their pension is higher without regard for the interests of the job. Dozens of reader responses to the item were received. We are publishing some of them as well as information received about steps which were taken.

I fully agree with the letter's author. Is this really fair? The fact is that to my great regret such things occur not just in the unit where Sr Lt Yu. Prosandeyev serves. My question is: Why do I, a company first sergeant who has served in the Armed Forces 22 years, have the same rights (in being credited for a pension) in working with personnel as those warrant officers who allegedly also were first sergeants or platoon commanders for a year or two? This is the question to which I would like to receive an answer.

As a matter of fact, order can be imposed locally to ensure that there is social justice in the unit where Prosandeyev serves, but loopholes for the "pension position" remain, which means the problem also has not been resolved.

We have different duties: some warrant officers bear enormous responsibility for the indoctrination and training of personnel, and others do not. I do not wish to say that these others have an easy time of it, but why, let's say, do many depot chiefs not wish to go serve as company first sergeants even for a higher rate of pay for the appointment? Why should they? They can "scare up" a "pension position" a couple of years before release to the reserve.

No, the result of our service in the Army must be summarized in a modern way, fairly, according to the work.

6904

It Is Impossible To Be Silent

18010023e Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Oct 87 p 2

[Letter by Lt Col (Ret) V. Shmukler, senior assistant procurator of Kursk Oblast, under general title "'Pension Position'"]

[Text] Why is it impossible to be silent? Well, because the publication of "Pension Position" does not give an answer to the question touched on by Officer Yu. Prosandeyev.

I wrote the word "question" but I myself wonder whether or not this is a question. If what the author is reporting is an "incident which occurs," then we can speak of certain violations of T/O&E and finance discipline. But what if this is not a question but a problem and if "pension warrant officers" really become necessary people?

I served over 27 years in the Soviet Army. I was released to the reserve from the position of deputy tank regiment commander. The principal figure among junior commanders at that time was the extended-term serviceman: driver-mechanic, tank commander, company first sergeant. Commanders of all levels relied on them in accomplishing the difficult tasks of combat training and of indoctrinating and training soldiers. I recall that there were neither "elbowing" people nor "necessary" people among them. There were masters of driving, marksmen, reliable commanders... I will not err if I say that my colleagues of that time have a hard time imagining a situation in which someone would engage in "scaring up" a position.

I am caused to reflect by the fact that one person acts as the enemy of "pension warrant officers" and the commander and his political deputy are acting against such an officer by suggesting that Prosandeyev look for another place of duty. These circumstances simply force me to take up the pen.

Being firmly convinced that the facts in question in the item are not systemic and are not inherent to our Army, as a veteran I would like to address those who in line of duty are responsible today for the life, daily routine and combat activities of subordinates. Dear comrades, ponder the words of Sr Lt Prosandeyev, who tells how he is accused of "truth-seeking" at a formation in the presence of unit officers. The article's author is not seeking the truth; he is fighting against untruth and expects support from you.

6904

A Typical Story

18010023e Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Oct 87 p 2

[Letter by WO [praporshchik] L. Boyko, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, under general title "'Pension Position'"]

[Text] I don't know who took what attitude toward the item entitled "Pension Position," but I believe that it told a typical story that has become so familiar that people have ceased noticing such a thing. For example, in our unit the position of support platoon commander was held over the last three years by three persons, and each one was released to the reserve. Now WO N. Pobol holds it, again "for now." He of course does not perform his duties; he appears in the motor pool when he has to "take a vehicle" to bring or haul something and so on. Indoctrination has been neglected in the platoon; there are constantly infractions of military discipline there. Here, by the way, is also how the "pension position" works out.

We also have "dead souls," as we call them—warrant officers who are on our rolls but who serve entirely in other units. We have repeatedly discussed these problems with the command authority, but matters do not go beyond talk.

6904

Corrective Action Taken

18010023e Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Oct 87 p 2

[Letter by Maj Gen Avn M. Prokudin, deputy commander for political affairs of Naval Aviation, under general title "'Pension Position'"]

[Text] The letters from Sr Lt Yu. Prosandeyev entitled "Pension Position" were discussed with directorate heads. Questions of appointing warrant officers are decided by the command authority, which is not subordinate to Naval Aviation. At our request, however, we were informed from there that an investigation was conducted and a response on results was sent to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

6904

Further Investigation Necessary

18010023e Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Oct 87 p 2

[Letter by Capt 1st Rank N. Trotsko, deputy chief of political department, under general title "Pension Position"; last paragraph is KRSNAYA ZVEZDA editorial comment]

[Text] Some facts were confirmed during an investigation of the questions raised in letters from Sr Lt Yu. Prosandeyev, but a portion of them was not confirmed. Sr Lt Prosandeyev's presence is necessary (he is on routine leave). A response will be sent in October 1987.

From the editors. Readers' responses continue to arrive. Unfortunately, however, the commanders and those in personnel and finance organs who are responsible for compliance with established rules and finance discipline have not yet responded. As we see, official responses published here essentially clarified nothing. Just what facts were confirmed? Which ones were not? Why has a "pension position" become possible? Who is at fault? Who will be held responsible?

6904

Lt Gen Galkin Interviewed for Tank Troops Day
18010016a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
 13 Sep 87 Second Edition p 2

[Correspondent Lt Col S. Pashaev interviews Lt Gen A. Galkin, chief of the Armor Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, "The Birth of Armor"; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] On the eve of Tank Troops Day, Krasnaya Zvezda correspondent Lt Col S. Pashaev met with Lt Gen A. Galkin, chief of the Armor Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. We are presenting their chat for our readers.

[Question] Comrade Lt Gen, in this 70th anniversary year of the October Revolution, our country will be honoring its tankmen for the 41st time. That is a considerable period of time and there is a new generation of both people and technology, but the love and pride of belonging of those who served and are serving now with the tank troops and the aspirations of many conscripts to become tankmen has not changed. How do you explain such constancy?

[Answer] First of all, certainly, by the fact that the tank troops are one of the main branches of our armed forces. They represent a powerful, mobile strike force of the Ground Forces and are honored by the glory of many of our victories.

I must also say that, like no one else perhaps, young people are drawn to the technology, desiring to master it and affirm their power over it. After all as everyone knows, our tanks have always been the embodiment of advanced scientific, design and technical ideas. In Soviet tank construction this trend is clearly evident if you follow its history. The best example of this is the famous "34" which for many years has set the fundamental direction in tank construction worldwide.

[Question] The history of the tank troops is indeed worthy of admiration and all the more so since it began essentially with several dozen tanks and armored vehicles which were far from perfect by today's standards...

[Answer] I think it useful to quote some figures here for they speak not only of the development of the tank troops, but also of the vast strides which our country has made in 70 years. For example, in October, 1918 there were 23 armored trains and 38 armored detachments in all in the forces of the Red Army. The foreign pattern showed us that, by our standards, this was a small, weak armor force. But in only 2 years, Soviet workers and equipment accomplished a truly great labor feat and were able to carry out a resolution of the RSFSR Soviet of Military Industry. On 31 October, 1920 the first domestically produced tank, called the "Comrade Lenin — Freedom Fighter", rolled out of the gates of the

Sormovskiy plant for field trials. By the end of 1920, the Red Army already had 103 armored trains and vehicles, and 51 armored and 11 motorized tank detachments.

The experience of employing armored forces at the fronts in the Civil War showed that they had great possibilities and could have a considerable impact on the course of armed conflict. For that reason, in the years that followed, the creation of powerful tank and mechanized troops became one of the most important directions in the building of the Soviet Armed Forces.

A school for domestic tank construction was formed and one of its characteristic traits was the harmonious integration of the main qualities of the tank: fire power, armor for defense and maneuverability. Indeed, the noted Soviet designers M. I. Koshkin, A. A. Morozov, N. A. Kucherenko, Zh. Ya. Kotin, N. L. Dukhov and many others made invaluable contributions to the creation of new types of armor technology and tank armaments.

[Question] But this is, after all, one side of the question. Simultaneously with the development of tank construction, forms and methods for employing tanks in combat were devised and perfected, military science was being developed and personnel were being trained. What can you tell us today about the lessons of this process?

[Answer] The country and its armed forces became stronger. Revitalized economic and technical resources allowed us to be the first in the world to create mechanized formations and, as early as during the Second World War as a consequence of increased production of combat vehicles, subsequently to create tank corps and tank armies.

Can I say something about the continuity of these traditions? Of course I can. You see, intensive development of the tank troops continued even after World War II. This was a result of objective necessity, dictated by the international situation which was taking shape. In the post war years, a significant part of the tank fleet was refurbished and the tank troops' technical equipment, their mobility, strike power and fire power were improved.

The continuity of tradition has not lost its significance even today when, considering the party's demands and the state of military doctrine, we define the direction and substance of troop training. Creative use of experience gained at the front helps us to determine more quickly how to develop domestic tank construction under new conditions and to study what is necessary in combat in which, as usual, tank troops are assigned an important role. Possessing great mobility, fire power and increased anti-nuclear hardening, they are capable of carrying out rapid advances, swiftly surmounting contaminated zones and conducting combat operations at high speed under virtually any geographic or climatic conditions, at any time of the day in any season, whether in conjunction with other troop branches or independently. The

strike power of the tank forces grew even more when highly maneuverable motorized rifle units on infantry combat vehicles and armored fighting vehicles and rocket, artillery, anti-aircraft and special subunits joined their ranks. All this obliges us to think about and search for new ways to use them more effectively.

[Question] Technology is indeed improving and the range of its possibilities is widening. But what about people? Isn't it true that, in the relationship between man and machine, at some level we will begin to fall behind and come second to the technology?

[Answer] That is not an easy question. In the end, efficient exploitation of the potential of any technology is dependent upon people. They decide the outcome of combat and battles. This is why increasing the role of the human factor first of all in the primary direction — in combat training, both in the tank forces and in the armed forces as a whole, is today the greatest of tasks.

There are problems here and we cannot brush them aside. There are a lot of examples of people who have the most modern technology at their disposal doing things the old way and not using the full power of its possibilities? Frankly we have not overcome either irresponsible or wasteful attitudes toward technology. We are fighting this. By personal example and social influence, commanders, political workers and technical service officers are trying to foster in their personnel a love for technology and a desire to be able to use it the best way they can.

Whether or not skilful training and educational work shows in practice can be judged, for example, by this episode from the everyday life of a soldier. A detachment securing the movement of one of the units of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan did not carry out its assignment. A patrol tank led by private Sergey Igolchenko, a member of the Young Communist League from the city of Buturlinovka in Voronezh oblast, encountered a bandit ambush and came under fire. The courageous mechanic-driver, who was eventually wounded, did everything he could to save the vehicle. Taking the gunner's place, he destroyed 3 enemy firing positions which threatened the tank and then pulled it back out of the fire.

Such examples are not rare today.

Nevertheless, we understand that we must constantly raise the requirements for training tankmen. This means both special training and moral, political and psychological training of personnel. I also think we need a sound adjustment to ongoing programs and courses. We must also worry about better quality professional and psychological selection of candidates for military academies, warrant officer schools and training units.

We can resolve these problems only provided that combat training really becomes the main thing in the life and service of the soldier, not just in word but in deed.

I cannot in good conscience say that we have improved methods in this primary, decisive area. Signs that there are problems in the training of personnel continue to appear. Just recently, for example, while our specialists were working with representatives of other chief and central directorates a number of important omissions in the training of students at the Kazansk Higher Tank Command Academy were uncovered. Today, serious measures have been taken to resolve this: the management of the academy has been strengthened; the academy is being equipped with a modern material and technical training base; and in student training, a practical direction to the studies has been emphasized.

[Question] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, our readers often complain in their letters that control on the part of representatives of the highest staffs and directorates at times turns into outright guardianship, substituting for the appropriate commanders or chiefs. To what extent is the working style of the officers of the Armor Main Directorate up to the demands of the time?

[Answer] Unfortunately, there are examples of what you are talking about. But let's clear up what we mean by control under present conditions. I cannot imagine control without help to resolve specific problems and an intensive pooling of experience. Help and guardianship are hardly one and the same. If at times the guardians have to roll up their sleeves and work in a unit, this in no way means that they are replacing someone. We are all working toward the same goal — combat readiness.

On the staff of the Main Armor Directorate there are many specialists with the highest of qualifications who have the necessary training and rich practical work experience. Unfortunately, you journalists write sparingly about the officers and generals of the main and central directorates so I want to take this opportunity to mention the names of several of our comrades who are well known both among the troops and in the production area. They are Maj Gen V. Bochkov and Colonels P. Fyedorov, Eh. Bolshakov, L. Getman and A. Stavnyuk.

[Question] The nation valued highly the feats of tankmen during the years of World War II and the heroic work of the tank builders and mechanics. How are the traditions of the war generation carried on today?

[Answer] Indeed, more than 1300 tankmen were honored with the lofty title Hero of the Soviet Union; 16 who particularly distinguished themselves were awarded this honor twice. Two hundred fifty thousand soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals were awarded orders and medals. All six tank armies, 12 tank and 9 mechanized corps, and 66 tank and 28 mechanized regiments received the "Guards" designation. Nine thousand tank builders were awarded orders and medals and many of them were honored with the title Hero of Socialist Labor."

I believe it would not be a sin against truth if I were to say that veterans of the war and labor passed the baton to capable hands. The present generation of Soviet tankmen is worthy and ready to fulfill its duty to the homeland. I have already given you one example and I could name other tankmen — genuine soldiers and patriots, masters of their craft. They include officers whose subordinates are in the vanguard of socialist competition to celebrate properly the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution. To name only a few: A. Grigorash, N. Balaban, Yu. Pakhomov, A. Mudrak and F. Guseynov.

Officers and internationalists A. Bordyuk, A. Lapshin, V. Pashkovskiy, V. Fyedorov and R. Irdashev have done

and are doing their patriotic and international duty while serving with the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, demonstrating courage and heroism. Workers, office workers and engineers, comrades S. Busov, N. Shekhov, V. Mosiashvili, P. Kurovskiy, A. Ozolin and A. Bomis are participating actively in the restructuring of production. There are many thousands who, by right, consider as their own our glorious holiday — Tank Troops Day. I want to congratulate them from the bottom of my heart and to wish them new successes and achievements.

13254

Battery Scavenges Radios To Maintain Tactical Communications

18010026 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Oct 87 Second Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col O. Falichev under rubric "Restructuring at the Regimental Level": "A Thin Thread"]

[Text] It was not an easy mission facing the surface-to-air missile [SAM] unit personnel. The air "enemy" was hugging the ground and employing intensive jamming. In order to detect him the operators were working unsparingly, as the saying goes, making maximum use of the equipment's tactical and technical capabilities. The battalion commanded by Maj I. Rezayev probably was in the most difficult spot. Its communications with the command post were interrupted at the height of the action according to an umpire's narrative problem and it had to function in an independent mode. That meant battalion personnel could count only on their own resources and on the radar company "connected" with the battalion; the company's role now sharply increased.

Maj Rezayev hopefully watched the actions of telephone operator Pfc V. Glebov, on whom quality of radar data being received from the company now depended. It was apparent from the soldier's tense face and the drops of sweat on his brow that audibility was poor and each fix was being obtained with difficulty, but Maj Rezayev could not help in any way. This was not only because each person has his own place in combat; he knew that the rather old receiver set up in the battalion was being taxed to the limit. It had been repaired repeatedly in an attempt to improve sensitivity.

The personnel nevertheless accomplished the mission and Pfc Glebov also functioned competently. Nevertheless, instead of a sense of satisfaction, a feeling of resentment remained in the commander's heart from the recent action: the fact is, they were within a hairsbreadth of failure.

The situation in which Maj Rezayev's battalion found itself is in fact unusually difficult. Problems never arise over receiving radar data in an ordinary situation. They are issued uninterruptedly from the unit command post both over conventional communications equipment and over the automated control system. And finally, the battalion has its own radar surveillance equipment permitting it to see and track the air enemy at a considerable distance.

But one can't order up a situation in combat. As the exercise showed, a situation may arise in combat against low-altitude targets where the battalion will need a fix from the radar company in front. A variant where the battalion is first to pick up the target also is likely. Then information on it will have to be passed to another subunit. The experience of the latest local wars indicates

that command posts are neutralized by electronic warfare equipment and become an important target for enemy aircraft. The need for battalion-company level communications increases under these conditions. Moreover, the SAM battalion's execution of the combat mission depends on the stability and reliability of such communications. This battalion, however, has a rather old receiver which has used up its operating life. Why?

"Under the TO&E we are not authorized radios in the battalions," says Unit Chief of Staff Maj V. Shtelter with a sad smile.

A strange situation, is it not? There is no authorization to have a radio, but the battalion needs communications with the company. What is to be done?

"We have to extricate ourselves," explains Maj Shtelter.

People in the unit do this in different ways. By hook or crook, they get sets that have been written off and used up their service life, they "scare up" sets above the limit at depots, and they repair and install old ones. In short, they extricate themselves. The equipment obtained with difficulty, however, still provides no guarantee of reliable communications, and not just because it already has been outdated and obsolete for a long while. In using the equipment, the missilemen have no opportunity to request a repeat of a missed word or a word distorted by jamming. After missing a fix they sometimes had difficulty reestablishing a target's flight path or would even lose it.

Let us examine another aspect of this problem. What does non-TO&E mean? Simply speaking, outside the law. Such equipment is not supported by spare parts. Specialists are not assigned to it. In the final account the specialists are found by stripping other posts. But is this to the benefit of combat readiness?

This has continued for more than a single year. The importance of this problem is obvious, but it is not being solved. I spoke with many unit officials on this subject and heard various opinions but did not find a convincing answer to how things specifically stand with this. The unit commander understandably must be concerned with solving the problem above all.

"We have repeatedly turned to the command authority on this matter," he says, "and spoke at a party aktiv meeting, but everything remains the same. Therefore we did what was within our power and we are making do with this."

"Repeatedly turned." But specifically who is refusing assistance and why, and who is not taking steps? It would appear that if people in the unit really were concerned with solving this problem they would know precisely who turned to whom and when, and what the result was. But people here apparently have resigned themselves:

the battalion commander because the regiment knows about these troubles; the unit commander and staff because for now they are getting by as it is.

It would appear that this "getting by for now" is the main reason for that attitude of the officials. There are no questions or demands from higher up, and so fine, let everything go on as it has. But just how long can this go on before lightning strikes?

Much is being said in the unit about restructuring the work and about changing the attitude toward questions of combat readiness and combat training, but essentially only those questions which lie on the surface, as the saying goes, are being touched on for now: people are trying to see that classes are not disrupted, that all personnel are engaged in combat training and that indulgences and oversimplification are eliminated. These questions are important and unquestionably necessary to resolve, but can we really close our eyes to the fact that the combat mission may be threatened with disruption even with the personnel's highest degree of training? The fact is that the makeshift communications which the battalion now has with the radar company is a thin, unreliable thread which may break at a critical moment.

No one ever told me straight out that the likelihood of this is very slight inasmuch as situations such as the one in which the battalion found itself are likely to occur very rarely, but it was not hard to catch this meaning. The fact is, however, it is clear to everyone that even the slightest possibility of missing an airborne target must be precluded, and if such a chink is discovered somewhere the alarm must be sounded immediately. It is already clear that such alarm is not being felt in the unit.

Restructuring is, as we know, the resolute overcoming of stagnant phenomena. For us in the military such phenomena must be overcome above all in the sphere of combat readiness and troop training, and the basis of its success is laid down at the regimental level. Everyone clearly understands this, but we have this specific problem of unreliable communications between battalions and radar subunits. Everyone recognizes its importance in the matter of combat readiness, but no decisive steps are being taken.

That is how things stand in the unit, but how about in the large unit [soyedineniye]? Do the officials know that the missilemen have such a problem? Staff Officer Lt Col V. Kompaniyets says:

"The commander is on leave and I am not ready to brief you at the given moment. I know that the commander has reported through channels."

I have to admit it seemed somewhat strange that an officer whose duty is to handle questions of communications proved "unknowledgeable." It occurred to me that Officer N. Zobenko, a communicator, is the one who should be "knowledgeable," but he was sincerely

surprised on hearing that under the TO&E the battalions have no radios for communicating with the companies. "this can't be," he uttered dubiously and telephoned the unit. It turned out that it could be.

"Our capabilities of helping the battalions, however, are very limited," said Officer Zobenko regretfully. "We have nothing with which to replace the old gear."

Later we had a conversation about these matters in the political department. the problem with the battalion's communications also was a revelation to the political officers.

"Can it be that we really do not have such radios?" asked Lt Col N. Fedorov, shrugging his shoulders. He immediately telephoned the depot. It turned out that there were several pieces of equipment. It is true that under the T/t they were earmarked for other purposes and also were not the most up-to-date, but for now they were available.

This meant that there still was something with which to close the gap. No one simply had specifically taken up the matter.

In pondering this fact the thought occurs that all officials involved in solving this problem are party members. they are obligated not only in line of duty, but also by party duty not to ignore such deficiencies. An impartial conclusion suggests itself: the party organization is poorly instilling the new thinking and irreconcilability toward deficiencies in party members, although there have been many discussions of this both at bureau sessions and at party meetings.

In this regard I would like to mention one other problem of no small importance—outfitting visual lookout posts. At first glance it may seem that the importance of such a post in the Air Defense Forces today in the age of radar, electronics and ASU (automated control systems) is not very great but, frankly speaking, it is very significant. This is dictated by the presence today of aircraft with minimal radar cross-section and those capable of nap-of-the-earth flying. Visual lookout posts (PVN) are intended for their detection in the SAM battalions above all.

In that same unit we were familiarized with the organization of duty at one of the posts in the battalion commanded by Maj V. Veremeyev. The post is a kind of armored cupola with glass-covered slits. It has a good field of view and telephone communications, but the windows fog up and most likely will freeze over in winter. What is the use of such a post? Does this mean observers are assigned for the sake of form?

"Yes," agrees Lt Col S. Pavlochenkov, a unit headquarters officer, "we are trying to eradicate this formalism but... Take a look at how the observer is equipped."

Yes, the binoculars which he uses are little stronger than opera glasses and in hours of darkness the observer is entirely helpless—there are no night vision devices at the post.

It can be added that the missilemen do not receive training sets of aircraft silhouettes or identification markings of the aircraft of foreign states. Each subunit makes them by a primitive method after their own way and manner. One can find different interpretations of the observer's duties in battalions even of the same unit. The fact is, however, that all these are matters of readiness to combat the air enemy.

The uncertainty over communications equipment and poor outfitting of visual lookout posts is a result of officials' inattention to these matters and the absence of necessary responsibility for the entrusted sector of work. Just how does the Air Defense Forces main staff view such a thing?

"Unfortunately some things in our establishment have been neglected," says Chief Signal Officer of Air Defense Maj Gen E. Ishchukov. "That state of affairs of course cannot be satisfying."

"These matters perhaps concern us to a lesser extent, but I am convinced that it is high time to resolve them," remarked Maj Gen V. Komissarov, chief of staff of Air Defense Radiotechnical Troops, with concern. "It happens that whatever you ask for out of the communications equipment, everything has to be obtained with a fight, as the saying goes."

Maj Gen B. Ovsyannikov, chief of staff of SAM Troops of Air Defense, also expressed his point of view:

"Yes, we are experiencing a shortage of communications equipment. The visual observation devices, deliveries of which are handled by the Ministry of Defense Main Missile and Artillery Directorate, require qualitative updating."

It seemed the problem had taken a new turn: there is a department which supplies obsolete products and takes no interest in improving them. But not everything turned out to be so unambiguous.

"We have developed and have been producing a large number of new optical visual observation devices for a long while now," said Col Yu. Kuznetsov, deputy department chief of the Ministry of Defense Main Missile and Artillery Directorate. "Among them are devices which permit good observation of small, low-flying targets."

Col Kuznetsov named several makes of optical devices with the most varied characteristics and purpose. "It is only regretful," he said in conclusion, "that requests for them are not being made by the air defense staffs and directorates."

Well, it turns out that there are modern devices, but there is no demand for them. The fact is that the demand must come above all from those who need these devices and who are interested in their deliveries.

I also had occasion to hear the opinion expressed on the main staff that these problems still would not be solved quickly. It was said that it often takes years for various substantiations and coordination, and people lose heart because of this. Well, that previously really was the case. This generated passiveness in people and disbelief that they would be understood, but now times are different and one has to believe that these problems will be promptly examined and resolved.

Questions of combat readiness, in the sphere of which stagnant phenomena must be rooted out above all, are resolved first of all in the regiment. Not everything is being done in this direction in the unit in question—some officials have resigned themselves to this state of affairs and display indifference. It is apparent, however, that not everything depends on the unit for solving some problems; new approaches by higher echelons also are required.

Yermakov Interview on Quality of Naval Officer
18010012 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Sep 87 p 2

[Interview with Rear Adm Ye. Yermakov, chief of the Personnel Directorate of the Navy, by Capt 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "The Military Cadres: Duty and Responsibility": "It Begins When they Are Cadets"; first paragraph is KRSNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The January and June 1987 Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee stressed the extremely important role of the leaders at all levels in the accomplishment of the tasks involved in our society's all-around renewal. In the Armed Forces this applies primarily to the officers. The restructuring here is taking two interrelated directions: improvement of the work performed with those who are already serving as officers or admirals and the preparation of officer replacements with qualities conforming to the tasks involved in the restructuring. The second direction involves both the short and the long term and is therefore of particularly great importance. This is discussed by Rear Admiral Ye. Yermakov, chief of the Personnel Directorate of the Navy, in an interview with Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, our correspondent.

[Question] Comrade Rear Admiral, along with all the others, the cadets assembled at the naval schools this year have just begun their training. Is there any certainty that this time we have succeeded in avoiding certain deficiencies which have become chronic in the selection of future naval officers?

[Answer] Not entirely. The selection and training of future officers is a key matter in the resolution of an entire group of problems pertaining to the restructuring in the navy. We understand this. It can still not be said that this understanding has become embodied in the practical work, however.

Let me begin with the selection process. The young people who enter higher naval schools should have the aptitudes necessary for developing the qualities of real seamen. In our enormous nation with its multimillion population there are extremely great possibilities for selecting precisely this kind of cadet candidates. Nonetheless, some people still end up in the navy just by chance. This "defect" is rooted in the selection system itself, which is still based primarily on passing grades. It is important to reveal the training level, to be sure, but we can also not underestimate the importance of studying the volitional, moral and performance features of the high school graduates, their motives and inner purposes for studying at a naval VUZ. Unfortunately, this kind of analysis is still receiving inadequate attention at the schools.

Favoritism is another impediment to good selection both in the process of accepting individuals at a school and in their placement upon graduating. One does not envy the school chiefs during the cadet selection period. What pressure the parents bring to bear upon them. It is frequently applied not directly but through influential people. This pressure is repeated when their children graduate from the schools. It focuses on getting the best possible assignment for the specific graduate. This frequently means a soft job on shore. The Navy command element is taking determined steps to put an end to favoritism.

[Question] But the navy's traditional concern for the continuation of naval dynasties can obviously not be ignored in the process, can it?

[Answer] Absolutely not. The navy is interested in dynasties, which carry heightened demandingness by one generation of the next. The evaluation of each high school graduate, each cadet and graduate should still in no way involve a formal approach, however.

[Question] A formal approach can distort even the most wholesome concept. And this is apparently still frequently encountered, is it not?

[Answer] A formal striving to achieve a highly stable group (which is determined in a way by the subsequent elimination rate), for example, has resulted in a distortion in the form of a drastic lowering of the demandingness applied to the cadets.

As a rule, those who do not measure up to the demands set for future officers are revealed during the first 2 or 3 years of training for the young fighting men. Their immediate superiors are in no hurry to rid themselves of this dead weight so as not to lower their performance figures. It sometimes reaches the point at which the schools graduate people whom the navy clearly does not need. And no one bears responsibility for this.

Here is a typical example. Lieutenant Selin, a graduate of the Pacific Higher Naval School imeni S.O. Makarov, began his service as an officer with drunkenness. His graduation certificate stated that he was inclined to abuse alcohol. It turned out that in his 5th year it had been recommended that he be discharged from the school for this, but the school chief had decided to let him graduate, the logic being that they could deal with him for a while in the navy and then discharge him into the reserve.

[Question] What makes them do that sort of thing? It is difficult to imagine that the school chief would not understand the harm caused the navy by such a decision.

[Answer] It is because school officials bear direct and immediate responsibility for the quantitative side but bear responsibility with respect to quality only if a higher agency receives a complaint from the navy. Since the

mechanism by which the navy evaluates school graduates and reports the evaluation to the proper authorities is not always activated, however, there are practically never any official complaints.

It is long since time to place the admission process onto a scientific basis, not be afraid to reduce the number of graduates and not permit to attain the rank of lieutenant those who do not have a high level of ideological maturity or are for any reason not capable of becoming fully qualified naval officers.

[Question] Those entering the naval schools are ordinarily young people whose character has not yet been completely shaped but who will be leaving the schools 5 years later as commanders and specialists, as real seamen. Can one say that the shaping of the necessary qualities is presently adequately provided for during the training years?

[Answer] Unfortunately, we still have to mention some unresolved problems in this respect. The schools have effective training programs which provide a clear picture of what sort of specialist the navy needs and the ways and means of preparing him. There are no equally precise indoctrinational programs, however, which define the minimum or what sort of qualities the graduate needs as a future indoctrinator of subordinates, as an officer-and-teacher, or how to develop them. And the training and indoctrination comprise a single process, in which both elements must be interwoven like the strands in a rope. It is an extremely important requirement of those who train the future officers that the training have a practical focus.

The personnel agencies also have a great deal to do in this respect. We have suggested to the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense that the certification forms be changed, be formalized to make it necessary to more fully describe the cadets and officers also with respect to these features: naval qualities, boldness, reaction speed, will, principle, determination and a great deal more. All of these variables constitute the main reference points toward which the indoctrinational program should be oriented both at the school and after graduation. Furthermore, such formalized forms could help to put an end to the harmful practice of impersonal certification, from which it is impossible to derive any sort of useful information.

[Question] Not just the commanders and political workers but also the instructors and military scientists are expected to take an active part in the indoctrination of the cadets, particularly when it is a matter of shaping purely naval qualities and a love for service at sea. The officers' personal example, their attitude toward this, is of paramount importance to the cadets. But is it always those who can set such an example who become instructors and commanders of the cadet subunits? The mail to the editor includes disturbing letters about this matter.

[Answer] Many errors are in deed still being made in the assignment of officers to the schools. For example, Captain 1st Rank Kazantsev was appointed chief of a department at the Pacific Higher Naval School. The question of removing him from his position and discharging him into the reserve for drunkenness arose sometime later. It is difficult to believe that commanders, political workers and officers in the personal agency did not know about Kazantsev's drinking habit. Unfortunately, such things are still occurring.

This is clearly a lack of conscientiousness in the performance of those officials who decide personnel matters. The problem itself is deeper and more complex, however. The whole problem lies in the absence of an effective and precisely defined system for selecting officers to work at the schools. This is frequently done the easy way and not the way it should be done to serve the cause. And doing things unsystematically can give rise to negative trends the combatting of which is very difficult or which in any case requires not only a super-effort but also a lot of time.

The following situation has developed at the Higher Naval Engineering School imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy. Practically all of the instructors in specialization, including the department chief, have shipboard experience only as commanders of BCh-5 [electrical and engineering division] groups. Naturally, teaching the cadets practical work skills and developing in them a love for shipboard service constitute their weakest point. How could such a personnel skew have occurred? At sometime someone engaged zealously in a campaign to get younger instructors and failed to notice that the department was being filled only with officers from the primary shipboard positions. They developed in their service at the school, and the situation began to exacerbate. Protecting their positions, the former group commanders naturally hampered the assignment of officers with more shipboard experience to the department. The command element and the personnel office looked the other way. We are presently making a determined effort to correct the situation, but it will take time to bring the situation in the department back to normal.

The trend is different at the Kaliningrad Higher Naval School. Personnel are selected primarily from the Baltic Fleet. It is nearby, and there are fewer problems. The cause suffers, however, since with the lower level of natural selection the demands made of the future instructors are lowered.

At the higher naval schools located in Sevastopol the selection is based primarily on whether the officer is able to find housing.

I must mention also the constant conflict which exists in relations at the school-fleet level. The fleets attempt to send to the schools not the best officers but those who have not performed well or are even a hindrance.

[Question] What role does the school's personnel department have today in restructuring the work performed with the cadets?

[Answer] We recently discussed this with the chiefs of personnel departments at higher naval schools. Although we worked out some solid positions on many issues, the conference as a whole was not satisfactory. It showed that far from all of the personnel workers have understood their role in the restructuring or actively entered into it. Captain 2nd Rank Yemelyanov from the Higher Naval School for Submarine Navigation imeni Lenin Komsomol and Captain 3rd Rank Bogdanin from the Kaliningrad Higher Naval School tried to merely present reports on their work even at the conference on the matter. They demonstrated an "anemic" sense of self-criticalness and an inability to see the entire scope of the problems and work actively to resolve them. One would hope that this is a temporary "malady."

I am still forced to note that officers capable of modern thinking and vigorous action are far from always selected for the school personnel departments. This itself is an

indication of a real striving by the school's command element for serious changes in the work, because they are taking as their assistants precisely the kind of officers they need. Experience has shown that inadequate professional competence influences personnel policy as a whole. It is no accident, for example, that year after year the navy receives replenishments with a fairly high percentage of "rejects" from the Higher Naval Radio-Electronics School imeni A.S. Popov and the ChVVMU [Chelyabinsk(?) Higher Naval School] imeni P.S. Nakhimov. An effective personnel policy at the Higher Naval School imeni M.V. Frunze, on the other hand, ensures a consistently good performance in the preparation of officers.

Concern and responsibility for this at all levels is an urgent requirement of the restructuring in the navy. It is important for all of us to thoroughly understand that the cadets are the navy's future. And it begins today.

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Flaws of Military Scientific Research Work
18010032 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Oct 87 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Medical Service A. Chirkov, Professor, Doctor of Pharmaceutics: "Looking at What Is Essential: What Should the Restructuring in Science Consist of?"]

[Text] I do not want to make contrasts, but one cannot escape a fact, as they say. The work of the scientific associate differs from that performed, let us say, by a doctor, a teacher, an engineer and many other specialists. Their work also unquestionably demands creativity. I want to talk about the specific nature of our work. The scientific associate must resolve a specific problem on the basis of profound theoretical knowledge and experience, and create or improve a certain item, design or set of methods needed in our service because of the demands of modern warfare. Another specific feature is the fact that scientific work forces the individual to take a broader look at the problem than the practical worker. Scientific quest requires analysis and forces one to compare alternatives, to seek and find the practical element.

All of that is so. The times and the tasks now being performed, however, demand that the scientific work itself be improved, that there be more creative activity—and therefore, a greater return. How can this be accomplished? Where should we begin the restructuring, and what should it consist of in science? How can we abandon the obsolete work style and methods which were established over the years? There are many questions. Unfortunately, there are far fewer precise and specific answers.

I believe that we must frankly admit today the fact that our scientific collectives include people who, because of their way of thinking, their skills, level of training, personal interests and efficiency, cannot—and sometimes simply do not wish—to set about the restructuring. The existing situation entirely suits them. They ordinarily come to work on time and leave punctually. They do not want to be bothered particularly during the work day or week. The fact is revealing that some of them have worked in the field of science for 10 or even 15 years but have been unable not only to write and defend a dissertation, but even to publish at least a few articles in the area of their research. They justify their position by saying that the scientific degree and the diploma are just a formality, pointing out that many heads of scientific teams do not have scientific degrees.

Cases in which people lacking a scientific degree are appointed as heads of scientific teams are in fact not so rare. In our view, this practice cannot be considered correct. Without profound competence on the part of the person in charge it is difficult to expect success in working on scientific problems. Success is achieved only in exceptional cases.

The resolution of other, purely scientific matters also suffers from this, and there are serious omissions in the planning. There are frequent cases, for example, in which subjects of insufficient urgency are accepted or assigned, without considering the makeup of the staff, the availability of personnel and equipment or the laboratory or industrial capability.

There is yet another problem: limited subjects. We know that such subjects do not provide an important return. Those in charge of the scientific research sections sometimes reconcile themselves to the narrowly defined subjects and even try to get as many such subjects as possible. As a rule, the limited subjects are concluded within 12 to 18 months. They do not result in important—and consequently, qualitatively new—articles or methods, or in-depth theses on scientific research and reports. Only a small portion of them are suitable for patenting. Not just the research establishments but also the client are guilty of errors in the planning. It frequently happens that after the plan has been drawn up and even approved—that is, after the personnel have been assigned and the labor and financial costs determined—the scientific establishment receives a directive from the client itself, sometimes from higher up, to add several labor-consuming subjects. This generates crash programs, and the plan is not well thought out and not realistic. Quality suffers as a result.

The way out of this situation would appear to be obvious. The compiling of start-to-finish plans embracing all stages in the creation of technical innovations—that is, all the way from the research to the designing to production—would help to improve the scientific elaborations. Working out the plan in this case would involve precisely defining the tasks, the deadlines and those responsible for carrying them out at each stage, as well as the financing procedure. Although this scheme is apparently simple, it is in reality greatly complicated by the departmental disassociation of the organizations performing the different phases of the work. The scientific and production capabilities need to be concentrated on the main, priority areas of work.

The development of the laboratory-production base is also among the problems which must be resolved. It is what makes it possible to shorten the distance from idea to application of the finished product. There is a direct dependency. The better the experimental and design base, the better (more modern) will be the technical item produced. Being skimpy with funds for creating the laboratory-production base increases the gap between idea and application.

And now, a few words about technical creativity at research establishments, using our team as an example. The fact should be mentioned that the number of suggestions for improving efficiency and the number of applications for patents on inventions are growing by the year. Unfortunately, however, there is still a great deal of confusion in this work, and it is not performed on a

planned basis. To a certain degree the rationalization proposals simply come about spontaneously. We have two few inventions. Experience has shown that the small number of applications for patents on inventions is caused by the fact that many scientific associates have a poor knowledge of patenting procedures, cannot find their way in the flood of information and do not know how to correctly draw up the description of their inventions.

I could go on with the list of problems which have been revealed and become particularly exacerbated during the period of restructuring. How can they be resolved? Without trying to be categorical, I shall offer a few ideas. First of all, I would stress the fact that the scientist does not earn his bread easily. And far from everyone is capable of becoming a real scientist. This has always been true. Let us frankly admit that only a few individuals with extraordinary abilities can rightly count on extraordinary success. This old truth constantly reminds us of itself.

This is the situation. An individual without a good ear and a good voice is not accepted at the conservatory, in the opera or on the big stage. A good musician must have musical talent. And there can be only one opinion about this. In this sense, however, the nature of the talent is similar in art and in science. Individual talent must therefore be the main criterion for accepting a person for a job at a research establishment. And the final arithmetic is easy: five or ten gifted, talented scientists will do more in science than 100 mediocrities.

And there is more. It is a fact that scientific work provides no material advantages, and the individual must put all of his heart and all of his energy into it. I am referring to that fortuitous coincidence when the right man and science find each other. Getting back to the matter of the staff and the organization of the research subdivisions, it is necessary to take into account also the present economic problems.

The fact is also indisputable that a scientific team cannot be made up entirely of exceptional individuals. The research results have to be processed, considerable preliminary work has to be performed to set up the experimentation, the equipment requires tuning, adjustment, routine maintenance.... In short, there is plenty of what we shall call "research-related" work to do at every research establishment, and it is extremely important. But this work also requires skilled and concerned specialists who strive for professional growth and improvement.

There has been a lot of talk of late about competition: competition of subjects, competition of those performing the work, competition of ideas and so forth. Competition actually does make it possible to improve the quality of the research and encourages the improvement of professional skills. Competition of important subjects and the redistribution of associates in accordance with

the list of subjects approved each year are essential. However.... Little comes of this in the situation of inflated staffs, when the wage fund and the director's earnings are directly dependent upon the official staff list. The research establishment must be granted a certain degree of independence in order to truly make its work more effective. The scientific councils headed by the establishment directors must have the authority also to determine both the number of scientific associates and their wages, based on the wage fund. And if the subjects of this or that scientific subdivision have not been accepted (have not met the competition), its staff could be reduced or the subdivision itself (laboratory, etc.) totally disbanded. Such steps are in keeping with the spirit of the restructuring and with the recent decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On the Conversion of Scientific Organizations to complete Economic Accountability and Self-Financing." The economic mechanism in science should help to place people where they can do the most good.

11499

Preparations for Winter in Transcaucasus MD
18010025 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Oct 87 Second Edition p 1

[Article by Col B. Chemezov, chief of department for direction of party-political work in military construction units, district political directorate; Col A. Bedarev, department chief of district KEU (billeting directorate); and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Col G. Barnev under rubric "Verifying Winter Preparations": "How Much is a Large Calorie?"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The Transbaykal Military District is one of the largest consumers of coal and fuel oil in the Armed Forces. Its heating establishment includes many boiler rooms, and the length of main lines and distribution networks is measured in hundreds of kilometers. Heat for the district means normal troop combat training, the people's health and the mood of posts. Life itself sets the problem of heat supply on a level with other very important problems of combat readiness. It is not surprising that back in March, before the district had "emerged" from that winter, the military council already was discussing the plan for preparing for the next winter, this winter, which is already on the threshold.

The district billeting directorate provided information that the readiness of boiler rooms and networks was almost 100 percent and a three month's reserve of coal, wood and fuel oil had been established at garrison fuel depots and in military units. There is no need to mention what enormous labor is behind these figures. The question is much more pressing now on the threshold of winter: What can be done to ensure that all this is used sensibly and zealously and the barracks, houses, training

classrooms and combat vehicle pools are heated? How economically will we use the heat, which last winter was sufficient far from everywhere?

The boiler room in the unit where Maj Yu. Kazakov is deputy commander for rear was fully ready for winter operation. Three boilers already were operating and the others were in reserve. Repairmen and unit personnel had worked well during the summer. Soviet Army worker V. Zhurba, a repair mechanic, renovated the electric motor drive. Its life was increased, but how about economy? What is the overall status here of the production cost of heat?

These simple questions nonplussed not only mechanic Zhurba, but also Soviet Army employee P. Baranov, chief of the boiler room.

"The important thing for us is that there is heat in the barracks, but we are not interested in how much a calorie or any other unit of heat costs. An accounting is not demanded for this," he responded.

Maj Kazakov also could not make things clear. It was only the next day that he was able to announce that expenditures for the boiler room and therefore for heat were R31,000 last year. Is this a great deal or a small amount? Is it good or bad? It is impossible to say, since the figure for expenditures was not correlated in any way with the amount of heat produced or the production cost per calorie. The fact is, however, that this is the indicator of fundamental importance, since only it permits a judgement as to the efficiency of boiler room operation and makes it possible to discover weak points in heat production elements.

It is not by chance that the CPSU Central Committee Decree "Progress in Preparing the National Economy for Operation Under Winter Conditions" notes with alarm that proper attention is not being given locally to the thrifty, zealous use of fuel and energy resources and emphasizes the need to step up the campaign against displays of mismanagement and wastefulness. In the boiler room where Soviet Army employee V. Bortnyak is the chief we had a conversation with Soviet Army worker V. Fedotov, boiler unit operator. The talk turned to the brigade contract and its advantages over the time-rate form of labor organization now existing in the boiler room. We arrived at a common opinion that a shift to the brigade contract would allow improving fuel economy, reducing the number of workers, raising stokers' earnings and at the same time the trade's prestige, and increasing the people's responsibility.

"We are ready for such a transition tomorrow if you like," said Fedotov. "We have repeatedly tossed this subject around among ourselves and have turned to the higher-ups, but matters have not budged for now."

The worker is right. Unfortunately people still have to speak of the brigade contract and its advantages in the subjunctive mood: if ifs and ands were pots and pans.

Meanwhile, a contract in boiler rooms promises appreciable economic advantages under Transbaykal conditions. One of us recently had occasion to become familiar with the experience of boiler room operation in an industrial enterprise of Chita Oblast which shifted to a contract basis. The familiarization proved to be interesting.

It is common knowledge that people work in boiler rooms in shifts every third day, but that day the collective of stokers and mechanics was in place almost at full strength. Some were standing watch and others were engaged in preventive maintenance. This circumstance was what was most astounding. Stokers were troubling themselves not only over what the water temperature was at the boiler outlet, but what the temperature of the "return flow" was. They took care to see that there were no heat losses on the line and were concerned with the end result. We will agree that these facts are not too ordinary.

When we related this experience to district officials we invariably met with understanding: the contract, they would say, is a good thing! There is understanding, but alas, no solutions. That is how it is.

We also inquired into how the units train stokers and maintenance personnel in other specialties. The fact is that in order for a person to do his job well and zealously he must be a specialist.

It was learned that the district has no training facility for this. The low-capacity training combine belonging to the district construction directorate barely meets the needs of the builders themselves. They have no time for the billeting directorate's needs, as the saying goes.

The district billeting directorate is finding a partial solution to the situation by training municipal maintenance service specialists at training combines of other districts, but in a large number of units stokers are trained locally according to the method of "look over my shoulder to see how I do it." Amateurish! Hence the breakdown and violations of limit discipline. It would appear that the question of one's own facility for training maintenance personnel has been pressing for a long time now. There will be no radical improvement until it is resolved.

Political School Increases Practical Side of Curriculum

18010034 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Oct 87 p 2

[Article by Col V. Bogdanovskiy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "At the Military Schools": "The Field Is the Main Classroom"]

[Text] Our son became a cadet at the Lvov Higher Military-Political School this year. We recently had the opportunity to visit him. According to Gennadiy, he is doing well, and we could see that for ourselves. One thing still troubles us, though. My son and his classmates began their training in the field. They say that this was not the case before....—the Pilipenko family, Romny, Sumy Oblast

Here at the school's training center the future political workers are mastering the equipment and weapons, engineering and tactics. It has now been turned over mainly to the first-year cadets. It is their main classroom.

"Unlike those of past years, these first-year cadets have indeed begun at the training center," Lieutenant General O. Zolotarev, school chief, said upon reading the Pilipenko letter. "And this is dictated by the times, by the need to bring the training and indoctrinational process into conformity with the practical needs."

"Incidentally, we are frequently asked questions like those contained in the letter by the parents of cadets," the general continued. "Recently, for some reason some of the youth and their parents have developed the idea that the political worker's job is something requiring only political knowledge and the ability to find a common language with subordinates. This opinion is wrong. The political worker, whatever position he occupies, is primarily an officer. As such, he is expected to teach and indoctrinate the fightingmen. He must know and be able to do a great many things in order to accomplish this."

A great deal is done at the school to see that the future officers not only acquire in-depth knowledge and practical skills in the special disciplines but also master the weapons and equipment and the tactics of modern combat. I am making only a hypothetical differentiation between these two areas. The training is a single process, closely interlinked. And the field is the whetstone on which is sharpened the future officer's professional skill, the place where his will is tempered and the fightingman's character is shaped. Incidentally, the training is now being conducted with new methods. It is set up so that the first-year cadet can test himself as a Komsomol group organizer, the editor of a news bulletin or a correspondent for a large-circulation publication during the performance of the combat training missions. And indoctrinational objectives are achieved along with the 'purely' training goals."

"I have been assigned the duties of editor of the news bulletin at the firing range today," Cadet S. Bolotov told me. "I am doing my best. What sort of editor would I be if I were to foul up on the firing line?"

I heard such statements from other cadets as well. They are indeed giving it their all. And that is not easy. Take the drills in the psychological [conditioning] zone or the training area where they are run over by tanks, for example. What must it be like for yesterday's 10th-grade student when explosions resound around him, when he hears the crackling of machine gun and automatic rifle rounds, when flames rage around him? And obstacles have to be overcome not with a light load but with full field gear! And what are one's feelings when a tank weighing many tons passes, rumbling and clanking, over one? Men such as Sergeant I. Zhurikhin, who served 2 years in the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, have been in far more difficult situations, of course. Most of the cadets, however, are young fellows who were just yesterday sitting in a schoolroom.

It is difficult, unfamiliar. I did not see a single disillusioned, dispirited or indifferent individual, however. At every step one notices unfeigned interest in the training and a desire to overcome difficulties and perform well. Watching as a tank passed over a cadet's head, and the cadet would immediately recover and toss a well-aimed grenade at the armored target, or seeing cadets skilfully "land" onto the armor of a combat vehicle out of trees, I simply could not believe that these young men performing so skilfully had crossed the threshold of the school only a few weeks before.

In recent years, along with the positive feedback about the graduates from the troops and fleets, we had begun increasingly to receive also statements about deficiencies in the officers' training. Some of them lacked military knowledge, practical skills, a good knowledge of methods, physical and psychological conditioning.

These reports were thoroughly analyzed and summarized in the school council, the political section and party committees. The vast majority of Communists in charge arrived at the most correct conclusion that the plans and programs needed more than just adjustment; they had to be fundamentally restructured to conform to the requirements for the training of modern military specialists. A great deal had to be changed, much had to be rejected, and many things had to be done a different way.

"Our graduates serve in practically all of the combat arms and branches of service," Colonel A. Fatkin, senior instructor in the Department of Combat Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Training, told me when I talked with him. "Until recently, however, all of the cadets, with the exception of seamen, studied equipment existing only in the Ground Forces. Imagine what it was like for a lieutenant starting to serve in an air unit? There was so much for him to relearn. And where was the time for that?"

Today the training is oriented toward serving in a specific combat arm from the very first year. The training process for the study of tactics, weapons and equipment is organized on this basis. Agreement was reached with district units to arrange for classes with the cadets to be conducted right at the training facilities of the units and subunits. The cadets, in turn, conduct various indoctrinational activities in the subunits, help to renew the visual agitation and arrange concerts by amateur performers. The theoretical training has also been changed. The number of seminars, individual talks and discussions for monitoring purposes has been increased considerably. In the department of journalism, which is headed by Lieutenant Colonel G. Krivoshchey, Candidate of Historical Sciences and Docent, the classes are increasingly being conducted in the form of seminars-and-discussions, lectures-and-dialogues and press conferences. Upper-class cadets regularly visit district and large-circulation newspaper publishers, where they serve as duty officers for issues of the publications.

All of the departments have made a decisive switch from lectures to practical work, to working out questions of specialization against a background of a specific tactical situation in the process of mastering the weapons and combat equipment. This is why the specific portion of field exercises has increased. In addition, beginning this year, the cadets will have to attend almost all of the exercises involving live firing in the district forces.

Under the current training program, the cadets will spend the first 2 years mastering the knowledge and skills

in the military disciplines essential for a platoon or company commander, while simultaneously acquiring the knowledge and skills of a subunit political worker. Their 2nd year will end with on-the-job training in the forces as deputy subunit commanders for political affairs. They will also have to perform an assignment in military journalism.

The new program has not been in effect very long, but certain improvements have already taken shape. It was certainly no accident that the school was the site of a scientific-methods conference for representatives of military-political educational institutions arranged by the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. The participants were particularly interested in the work performed by the departments of the military and special disciplines in organizing comprehensive field exercises and developing in the cadets good moral qualities and good communication skills.

The conference participants did not merely adopt all of the best things, however. They also debated, made suggestions and told about the changes which had been made at their schools. A specific and earnest exchange of know-how is very important today, when the military school is being restructured. It is now a matter of actually applying all of the best things, universally and without delay.

11499

U. S. Intent, Stealth Technology Examined
18010014e Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian
No 9, 1987 pp 30-31

[Article by research engineer V. Nadezhdin under the rubric "A Topic Suggested by Readers," with the footnote "According to foreign press materials": "The Invisible Aircraft: Why the United States Is Introducing 'Stealth' Technology in Military Aviation"]

[Text] The term "Stealth" has been mentioned more and more frequently in recent years by the press, radio and television in reports on the aircraft arms race unleashed by the United States. Our journal has already told about the aircraft being developed with this technology, and yet readers are still asking: What is "Stealth" technology? Why are they introducing it into military aviation so urgently?

According to the foreign aviation press, five programs to develop aircraft using Stealth technology are now under way in the United States. These are programs for the Lockheed Corporation's F-19, which is already in serial production; the Northrop firm's ATB advanced strategic bomber; the ATP tactical fighter for the U. S. Air Force; the ATA tactical aircraft for the U. S. Navy, and the ACM cruise missile, which is being developed by the General Dynamics Corporation.

The F-19 and ATB are among the priority programs. The sizes of the appropriations attest to this. According to official information, it is planned to spend 34 billion dollars for the development and production of 132 ATB bombers. Official information on how much the F-19 aircraft will cost the taxpayers has not been reported. According to the estimates of foreign specialists, 7.3 billion dollars will be spent to produce 100 to 120 aircraft of this type. Justifying to the U. S. Congress the need for vast appropriations to "finish arming" aviation with aircraft built with Stealth technology, R. Cooper, director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, stated that it "is the most revolutionary improvement in the field of military aviation since the jet engine and the sweptback wing."

Just what is Stealth technology?

All the work connected with the application of this design and technology have been classified secret in the United States. However, many materials appearing in the foreign specialized press in recent years make it possible to put together a fairly complete picture of the concept. The journal INTERAVIA AEROSPACE REVIEW writes that Stealth technology (Stealth [in English] means secrecy [skrytnost]) is a system of measures and technical solutions aimed at significantly reducing the level of the following six basic features which reveal the position of an aircraft: radar (RLS) returns; heat radiation; the presence of smoke in exhaust gases; the vapor trail; visual observation; and engine noise.

Reduction of the effective reflecting surface (EOP) of an aircraft is one of the most important elements in Stealth, since radar is the principal sensor for the PVO [air defense] system. Reduction of the EOP is achieved in two ways: by eliminating elements in the aircraft structure which effectively reflect a radar emission, and by using radar-absorbing materials (RPM).

It is common knowledge that the angular joints of surfaces, large vertical planes, sharply protruding structural elements, and the various antennas and metal first stages of jet engine compressors are good radar reflectors. For this reason, an appropriate layout and configuration is selected for aircraft being built in accordance with Stealth technology which takes these requirements into account: the wing should be smoothly coupled with a fuselage having a very thin profile; the tail fin and other stabilizing surfaces should be either removed completely or significantly reduced in size and canted inward; the engines are installed deep in the fuselage at the end of long curved air intake channels which are encased in radar-absorbing materials to suppress the radar echo from the first stage of the compressor; and armament is positioned inside the fuselage.

Specialists believe that the "flying wing" configuration with a lifting body meets these requirements most completely. However, it should be noted that reducing the stabilizing surfaces and making use of unconventional aerodynamic shapes lead to a significant decrease in the aircraft's margin of stability. And this entails the need to use a control system which provides for active stabilization in flight, for which a powerful on-board computer is required.

Carbon-based compounds, which are part of most modern composites, are considered to be among the most effective radar-absorbing materials. At the same time, it is pointed out that an iron filler in the form of particles or needles which absorb the electromagnetic energy of a radar emission may be introduced as part of the composition materials used in building the Stealth aircraft. Coatings of ferrite materials, which also absorb the energy of an emission well, are probably being used in addition to the composition materials. They were developed in Japan, and the U. S. Department of Defense obtained samples of them in the early 1980's. Reduction of the engines' heat radiation is considered the second most important element in Stealth technology. This is related to the fact that thermal-imaging systems are the only means, aside from radar, for detecting aircraft beyond visual range. Moreover, the guidance systems for missiles aimed at airborne targets operate in the heat spectrum of electromagnetic waves.

The specialists single out three basic sources of an aircraft's heat radiation: the engine, the jet blast, and structural elements heated by airstream friction. Obviously, aircraft built with Stealth technology must have an exhaust system which restricts radiation from hot engine components to the smallest possible angle. A flat jet

nozzle, which they believe will limit heat radiation when the engine is operating with the afterburner off, may be used for this. Devices which provide for either active mixing of the flows around the main and internal contours of the engine or formation of a screening flow of cold outside air around the jet blast are possible to make the effect of the jet blast into the nozzle structure less conspicuous.

Thermal radiation from the structural elements heated by the airstream is less intense, but it also may become dangerous in view of improvement in thermal-imaging detection systems. In order to reduce the level of it, a closed-cycle cooling and life-support system, that is, one which discharges the radiation of heat into the surrounding space, is possible (for example, by the fuel's absorption of excess heat) as well as the use of heat-absorbing coatings for structural elements that are heated aerodynamically.

In the specialists' opinion, suppressing emissions from the aircraft's own on-board electronic systems is a complex task for the designers. Ways of resolving this problem are mentioned in the articles that have been published: installing avionics equipment in a single screened compartment, reducing the number of antennas (since each one reemits part of the energy it receives), and installing them under emission-absorbing domes with radio-transparent windows which may be opened and closed. Development of passive on-board target search and tracking systems, first of all, and thermal-imaging sensors and sensors in the millimeter-wave band are also being planned, as well as improvement in data processing facilities, which will make it possible to use on-board radar with less power which emits a signal for a brief period of time.

The use of sound-absorbing materials and structures in the outer casing of engine compartments is possible in order to reduce acoustic detectability in the Stealth aircraft. The likelihood that a vapor trail will be formed may be reduced by using chemical fuel additives which change the size of the water droplets formed in the exhaust jet. They mention active camouflage systems as a promising means of reducing optical detectability, that is, systems of lighting devices which will adjust the intensity of light on the aircraft's surfaces to the background intensity.

It is believed that active work on developing combat aircraft that are not easily detectable was begun in the mid-1970's by the Lockheed firm within the framework of the XST (Experimental Stealth Tactical) aircraft program. The magazine *FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL* wrote that the XST is a single-seat subsonic monoplane with two engines, each of which develops 5,400 kilograms of thrust. Four such aircraft were built by 1981, and two of them crashed. After testing the XST where air defense systems were used, at the secret U. S. Air Force proving grounds in Tonopah, the firm obtained a contract to develop the tactical F-19 aircraft and to build the

first group of 20 of this type. (Footnote: See KRYLYA RODINY No 9, 1986, with regard to this aircraft) There have been no official figures on the cost of one F-19, but specialists estimate it at 40 to 70 million dollars. Although the U. S. Department of Defense still does not officially acknowledge the existence of the F-19, many journals claim that series production of them is already under way and that up to 30-40 aircraft are being turned out annually.

In this connection, it is worth recalling the report in a February issue of *THE NEW YORK TIMES* that, according to its information, the U. S. administration was planning to use the F-19 to carry out a strike against the residence of Libyan Leader M. Qadhafi in Tripoli. This was opposed by W. Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who stated that Stealth technology is too valuable to risk in such an operation.

The U. S. Strategic Air Command became interested in Stealth technology after series production of the Rockwell firm's B-1A bomber was canceled in 1977. By early 1979 the feasibility of developing a Stealth bomber was substantiated, and in 1981 the Northrop firm acquired a contract to develop the ATB strategic bomber. The Boeing and Vought firms became its partners in the program. Northrop is the primary contractor for the ATB program, Boeing is responsible for development of on-board electronic equipment, and Vought is charged with developing improved materials for use in the aircraft's construction. Improved F-101 engines made by General Electric are planned for the power plant

A full-scale mockup of the bomber was built at the start of the program, and flight testing of a small-scale demonstration aircraft was begun in 1982. It was suggested in the *AEROSPACE DAILY* bulletin that the first flight of the experimental ATB would take place in late 1987 or early 1988, that 18 series bombers would be put into service by 1992, and that their number would be increased to 132 by 1996.

In the opinion of many foreign aviation specialists, the ATB bomber will have the configuration of a "flying wing." They note that selection of the Northrop firm as the primary contractor may be related to the fact that it built and tested two "flying wing" aircraft in the 1940's. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the bomber's hypothetical exterior appearance and layout. According to estimates in the foreign press, it will have a maximum takeoff mass of 181 tons and a combat load of 18.1 tons; it will have a wingspan of 45-53 meters and an area of 370 square meters. The vertical tail surface will either be absent altogether or consist of two small fins canted inward. As reported in the magazine *AIR INTERNATIONAL*, forms of advanced technology such as a control system with fiber-optic signal transmission lines, ultrahigh-speed integrated circuits, expert [ekspertnyye] systems, a satellite communications and navigation system, bistatic radar, and so forth are being planned for the aircraft.

The armament will include a Stealth cruise missile being developed by the General Dynamics firm. They are studying the possibility of using an on-board laser weapon and non-nuclear bombs with advanced explosives which release 10 times more energy than nitroglycerine. The basic mission of the ATB is believed to be combat against mobile intercontinental missile launchers. It is assumed that its low detectability will make it possible for the aircraft to fly at high altitude in the air defense radar coverage zone, which will facilitate target search and detection. In the specialists' opinion, any other bomber would be quickly detected and shot down under such conditions.

The use of Stealth technology creates many problems for defense systems. The principal advantage of an aircraft with low detectability is that it can detect the enemy's radar before it is detected itself, and this will enable it either to employ more effective countermeasures or to execute maneuvers in time to avoid the air defense zone. At the same time, some specialists are rather skeptical about statements concerning the Stealth aircraft's "invisibility." Thus, a staff member of the English (Plessy) firm, A. (Veys), states in an article published in the journal *INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE REVIEW* that progress in radar development makes it possible to assume that radar will continue to be the principal means of aircraft detection in the future, and he cites a number of well-grounded arguments to support his view. The views of some other airborne target detection specialists are expressed in the same vein.

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8936

U.S. Helicopter Minesweepers Discussed

18010024b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Sep 87 p 3

[Article by Colonel G. Vasilev: "Minesweeping Helicopters"; first paragraph is introduction. Passage in boldface as published]

[Text] One of our readers, M. Berezov, from the city of Lysva in Perm oblast, has asked us to write about the American minesweeping helicopters operating in the Persian Gulf. We do so in the following article.

When they decided to start escorting Kuwaiti tankers through the Persian Gulf, US Navy staff were probably not fully aware of the risk involved in the undertaking. For a considerable period of time, the US naval vessels operating there were almost defenseless and in danger of being damaged by mines as they moved through the gulf.

As soon as the first tanker was damaged by a mine, the White House and Pentagon began looking for ways to protect the American armada, and to this end deployed minesweeping helicopters from the US to the Persian Gulf.

The Americans first used helicopters to clear mines during the aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, when they swept for mines around the amphibious landing site of Wonsan. At that time, the US Navy did not have specially equipped minesweeping helicopters, and anti-mine operations consisted of visual spotting of mines and their subsequent destruction by machine gun fire from troop transport helicopters. (The Americans repeated this in the Persian Gulf. At first, since they did not have specialized units or equipment, finding and destroying mines was the job of anti-ship and multi-purpose helicopter crews stationed on the ships escorting the Kuwaiti tankers.)

When the Korean War was over, the US continued to study helicopters as a tool for clearing sea mines. In 1965 this work culminated in the RH-3D minesweeping helicopter, and in 1973 the more powerful RH-53D, which was successfully used in April and May of 1974 to clear mines from the Suez Canal, and in 1984 to clear them from the Red Sea.

According to US Navy staff, minesweeping helicopters offer several advantages over minesweeping ships. First, they are cheaper to operate. In addition, they can operate faster than minesweeping ships, are more maneuverable, and are not vulnerable to mines. Their main advantage is that they can be transported by air. For example, the C-5A Galaxy cargo plane is able to carry up to two of the helicopters. The Navy exploited just this advantage when it deployed eight RH-53D helicopters—now stationed aboard the Guadalcanal—to the Persian Gulf.

The RH-53D is the US Navy's main anti-mine helicopter. Its job is to locate and destroy moored and ground mines using towed contact, magnetic, and acoustical minesweeping gear. The hydro-acoustic AN/AQS anti-mine system can also be used to locate mines. Because the bottom of the fuselage is water-tight, the helicopter can land on the water if necessary, and remain there at least two hours with its engines shut down.

Two 12.7 mm cannons are mounted on the helicopter to permit it to shoot at floating mines. Another important piece of equipment is a unified flight guidance system that permits precision minesweeping, even at night and during periods of reduced visibility. This system automatically keeps the flight altitude (20-30 meters) during minesweeping at the same level, and ensures that the distance, direction, and altitude relative to the lead helicopter remain steady.

The helicopter has a crew of six, including experts in anti-mine equipment.

When using the MK-103 contact sweep gear, a minesweeping helicopter can sweep a zone of 50 meters in width at a speed of 25 knots. The sweep gear is set in place and picked up directly by the helicopter, with about 30 minutes being necessary for each operation.

The MK-104 acoustic and MK-105 electromagnetic sweep gear are generally used together, and destroy mines with acoustic, magnetic, or combination detonators by producing fields similar to those that a ship would produce. The MK-106 combination sweep gear is also used for this. The above gear permits sweeping at speeds between 10 and 25 knots. The MK-105 and MK-106 have to be set in the water from the deck of a ship, since they are too large for the cargo compartment of the helicopters.

However, according to foreign experts, minesweeping helicopters also have major weaknesses, and these have forced naval staff to seek other ways to combat mines. These include recommissioning minesweeping ships and deploying them to the Persian Gulf, as well as requesting assistance from NATO allies. The main problem is that the helicopters are dependent on helicopter carriers, which makes it difficult to deploy large numbers of them without additional ship deployment. Also, they can only carry four hours worth of fuel reserves, which limits the amount of time they can operate independently, and are supposed to fly no more than three missions per day, which cuts into the mission schedule. When the time needed to set the sweep gear in place and remove it are taken into account, it is clear that total sweep time is limited to nine hours per day per aircraft. And finally, meteorological conditions also affect operations to clear mines in this area. 13189

Golts on Development, Uses of U. S. Special Operations Command

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Sep 87 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reviewer Aleksandr Golts under the rubric "Military-Political Review": "Why Washington Has a 'Stiletto'"]

[Text] This took place last Tuesday in the Persian Gulf. Helicopters which took off from the deck of the American frigate Jarrett subjected the Iranian navy vessel Iran (Adzhr) to heavy fire. According to U. S. representatives, the helicopter had followed the Iran (Adzhr) and established that the Iranians were laying mines in international waters. After the attack, the vessel caught fire and the crew abandoned ship. After some time American servicemen boarded it. Later, at the order of Pentagon chief Weinberger, the vessel was blown up and sunk. Iranian President A. Khamenei, addressing the UN General Assembly, categorically denied the U. S. version as a "flagrant lie." In any case, it is common knowledge that this incident has sharply heightened tension in the Gulf region.

The U. S. press reported that the attacks against the Iran (Adzhr) were delivered by helicopter pilots from "Team 160"—a supersecret special operations unit. And the

vessel was seized by U. S. Navy commandos. The fact that this action which has stepped up the confrontation was carried out by servicemen in the special operations forces is no coincidence.

Created in 1952 at the height of the war in Korea, these formations are now given special attention by the administration in Washington. In recent years they have received a veritable shower of appropriations. I will cite just a few figures: 441 million dollars went to maintain these forces in 1981, but four times as much was spent this year—1.7 billion. Next year it is planned to allocate 2.5 billion. And 12 billion in all over a 5-year period.

The special operations units have literally flourished under the rain of gold. The Green Berets and Rangers, whose hands have been covered with the blood of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, now are stationed not only in U. S. territory, but in the FRG, South Korea, Japan, and Panama. The size of the forces has been increased by one-third as much since 1981, reaching the level of 9,000 servicemen. And as for their counterparts in the Navy (these units are called SEALs—the first letters standing for "soldiers of the sea, air and land"), their number is to be increased still further by one-third as much; at present there are "only" 1,700 of them.

This concerns the "old" special formations. But new ones have emerged in the 1980's. These are the supersecret "Team 160," the Delta "antiterrorist" team, the "Army Reconnaissance Support Group," and the 1st Special Operations Air Wing, which has been entrusted with taking the saboteurs into the combat zone. Altogether there are over 15,000 crack soldiers and officers in the special forces today, but there will be 30,000 of them by 1990, according to the American press.

This year all these units, "teams" and "groups" were combined into a single strike force—the Special Operations Command, under the overall control of a special assistant to the secretary of defense.

It is not hard to figure out that Washington's foreign policy has brought these professional killers out onto the military-political forestage. These units are actively preparing to carry out combat operations against the socialist countries and sabotage on a large scale. At one time the West German magazine STERN reported that two dozen strategic areas had been earmarked in the territory of the USSR for Green Beret operations, and that eight areas had been designated in Poland, six each in the GDR and CSSR, three each in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and two in Hungary. I would remind you that the Green Berets may also be armed with nuclear mines. And they perfect their use in the course of maneuvers such as the American-South Korean "Team Spirit," for example.

At the same time, Washington assigns one of the principal roles to these forces in its political suppression of the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America. We have already told our readers about the

entire theory of military operations worked out for this purpose. This involves so-called low-intensity conflicts and subversive operations as one of the principal forms of combat activity in these conflicts. "Special operations," the journal *MILITARY REVIEW* points out, "fill the vacuum between diplomacy and ordinary operations, that is, in the area of low-intensity conflict." The U. S. secretary of defense expresses it more graphically: "We need not only a sword, but a stiletto." *TIME* magazine dots the "i": "crack units for the dirty work" are necessary.

The "dirty work" consists of direct intervention against developing countries, conducting undeclared wars against them, preparing and arming bands which operate against the people's governments, and training the punitive groups of dictatorial regimes...

These units can play the role of a fuse in provoking international conflicts, which is borne out by the situation in the Persian Gulf. They go ahead of the first wave of interventionists, as in Grenada: commandos and SEALs were brought in several hours before the start of the invasion on the island. Navy saboteurs were assigned to take the radio station. Specialists in "antiterrorism" were ordered to seize the prison and move on to the capital, leading the criminals.

Special operations units and subunits are taking part most actively at present in all the undeclared wars of the Reagan administration. A special place has been assigned here to "Team 160," stationed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. According to the American press, this team's helicopters have been flagrantly violating the norms of international law by regularly intruding in Nicaragua's airspace to deliver weapons and ammunition to the Somoza gangs. Moreover, according to information from the Knight-Ridder press service, they have been providing combat support for the Contra detachments. At the same time, pilots from the "team" hinted to journalists that they have been providing cover for their colleagues from other special units.

It has been established by documents that the servicemen in these units are today engaged in training dushmany, Contras, and other renegades.

Finally, we have to mention in particular the work of the Green Berets as instructors in the forces of dictatorial regimes. According to the magazine *U. S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT*, in the past year alone such "training teams" were sent to seven countries. *TIME* magazine points out that up to a hundred such groups have been sent during the 1980's.

One Carlos Montano, who served at one time in the Salvadoran punitive army, told West German journalists the kind of "science" they are teaching there. "The servicemen who instructed us in torture were Green Berets," he said. "They tortured a boy 16 years old; they drove knife blades under his fingernails, then forced his

eyes out of their sockets. After this they began thrusting bayonets into him. And then they stripped the skin off his head. And after realizing that they could not do anything else with him, they poured gasoline over him and set him on fire. The next day they tortured a 13-year-old girl the same way." And after this they orate in Washington about "human rights" and about the "struggle for freedom..."

Showing off their disregard for their own lives, the helicopter pilots in the same "Team 160," who operate at night as a rule, have chosen their motto: "Death waits in the dark." But as we see, the experience of the U. S. special operations units demonstrates that they prefer to kill, not die, in the dark. And to kill peaceful residents and those who cannot respond blow for blow.

And now, after we have explained just why Washington is expanding and building up its special operations forces, let us turn to the main theme of American propaganda, with the aid of which they attempt to justify all this policy of state terrorism. It turns out that one of the principal tasks of the Delta, Green Beret and other formations is "the struggle against terrorism." There is even a special presidential directive, Number 138, for this purpose.

And very curious publicity measures are chosen to ensure that the public does not forget about the commandos' "antiterrorist activity." Thus the *WASHINGTON POST* recently reported that terrorists from a certain secret organization, the "Red Cell," had attacked the aircraft carrier *Kitty Hawk*, kidnaped an American general and his wife, and even—horrors!—attacked the president's airplane. All this was staged by one of the SEALs subunits. It was supposedly a test of the readiness of Pentagon services for incidents such as this. The main thing was that it brought on an "antiterrorist"—more precisely an anticommunist—psychosis this way.

Actions with an "attack" and "kidnaping" have been needed by those who are attempting to whitewash the terrorists in military uniforms after the "Iran-Contra" scandal. In fact, another interesting fact was brought to light in the course of the examination into the illegal sale of arms to Iran and the illegal financing of the Contras. It turns out that the well-known Lieutenant Colonel North was able to have several such special groups at his disposal without practically any control. And they included those who are armed with atomic ammunition as well. How can we help but recall here the arguments heard in the American capital that some madman, they say, can get possession of nuclear weapons.

So the sinister relay race of provocations, terror, and mass murder has been continuing for over 30 years now. But the American special forces do not have an abundance of victories. Their criminal deeds did not save the aggressors and their puppets from defeat in Korea, in Indochina, in the Bay of Pigs, and in the Iranian desert. Their followers are suffering failure after failure in

Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and other countries where the people are conducting a successful struggle for their sovereignty and freedom. And even in those states where the Green Berets have felt at home in the past, Washington's proteges, who vainly set all their hopes on foreign punitive expeditions as a panacea for the inevitable social changes, are gradually losing their influence.

And the problem here by no means lies in the cutthroats' lack of experience or in the lack of death-dealing equipment, although many in the United States attempt to explain the failures precisely this way. Attempts at secret operations, to stop the course of history, and to stop social progress, even with the aid of a poisoned "stiletto," are useless today. And of course, such attempts are inhumane and immoral. "It is heartless to proclaim regions and continents special interest zones of the 'free world,'" stressed the head of the Soviet delegation, addressing the 42d UN General Assembly session. "It is heartless to recruit and arm mercenaries, to declare them freedom fighters, and to pay millions of dollars for the murders they commit; and it is heartless to put weapons in the hands of cutthroats which they use to shoot down civil aircraft."

These words reflect the anger and pain for thousands of lives taken away in the undeclared wars unleashed by imperialism. These words are a resolute condemnation of the organizers of international terrorism and those who serve it.

8936

U.S. Use of Force in Persian Gulf Said To Contravene Law

18010014d Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Oct 87 p 5

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reviewer M. Ponomarev: "With Imperial Arrogance"]

[Text] The situation in the Persian Gulf region continues to be dangerously explosive. One of the direct consequences of the armed conflict between Iran and Iraq has been the "tanker war" in the gulf waters, accompanied by mining of the most important international sea-lanes and very dense traffic. The massive American military presence in the region is leading to further aggravation of the tension, not to its relaxation. The concentration here of four dozen U. S. warships and 25,000 servicemen is seriously hampering the search for ways to settle the conflict.

The Soviet Union has drawn the attention of the world public to these circumstances more than once. But certain circles in Washington have not wanted to listen to the voice of reason. On the contrary, new steps were undertaken recently which attest to the premeditated exacerbation of the situation in the region. Moreover, more and more new facts attest to the fact that the

United States is cynically defying the universally recognized norms of international maritime law under the pretext of protecting the freedom of navigation.

Let us turn our attention to a statement by the U. S. secretary of defense which was published recently. In accordance with this document, American warships and aircraft are authorized to employ force in the Persian Gulf region, and the procedure for using it was specified. As the statement points out, this procedure was drawn up especially for this region and is guidance for actions by all commanders. Thus it turns out that the war department of the United States, without taking anyone or anything into consideration, has assumed the right not only to give orders in its own way on the international sea-lanes, but to engage in operations there which can only be called arbitrary.

In fact, it is worth familiarizing ourselves, if only cursorily, with the content of the Pentagon's unprecedented statement, and how its illegal nature arrests one's attention, let us say frankly. It shows disregard for the principles and norms of international maritime law set forth in a number of the most important documents—the Geneva Convention on the Open Sea of 1958, the UN Convention on Maritime Law of 1982, and other international legal documents, and it violates the laws and customs of naval warfare reflected in these documents. After all, these laws and customs specify that naval operations may be conducted only by the naval forces of the belligerent sides and only within the limits of the theater of naval warfare covered by the open sea, the territorial and inland waters of the belligerent states, and the airspace over them. And there are areas especially stipulated which cannot be included in a theater of naval warfare, the straits used for international shipping in particular.

I repeat, these are principles and norms that have been consolidated in internationally recognized and binding documents. But what does the Pentagon care about international law. Judging from everything, its leaders reason this way: if the law does not correspond to its ambitions, so much the worse for the law itself.

The United States is not a belligerent side in the Iran-Iraq conflict, and consequently, it cannot conduct naval operations in the Persian Gulf, as well as in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. American vessels, at least thus far, have not been subjected to direct attacks by Iran's naval forces, and for that reason they have not had any grounds to make use of the right to self-defense. One would think that this is obvious. Obvious to everyone, but not to the Pentagon. It has its own standards.

A basic document such as the UN Charter should be mentioned here. Article 51 of the charter refers directly to the inalienable right of individual or collective self-defense, but what is fundamentally important in this case—only if there is an armed attack on a member state of the United Nations. But a warship is a particular

organ of a state, the holder of its sovereignty, and in this sense we can say that an armed attack on a ship is equivalent to an attack on the state itself when the right to self-defense comes into force. But this principle of the UN Charter, which the United States also has signed, is contravened by the author of the Pentagon statement with a stroke of the pen. A state is not determining if there is absolutely an armed attack against it, but the commander of an American vessel is. And not even an attack, but just a "demonstration of hostile intent." And all the available means at its disposal are brought into action. It comes out swinging.

Such an approach has been predetermined by the U. S. secretary of defense. His statement says simply that any aircraft or surface vessel which is maneuvering into a position from which it can launch a missile, drop a bomb or open machine-gun fire on a ship is demonstrating hostile intent. And American vessels and aircraft are authorized to defend themselves from the threat from the air or the surface evidenced by such an intent. The ship commanders are authorized to determine that this threat is hostile. They are charged with responding to the threat by making use of any weapon and all the guns at their disposal.

An interpretation such as this opens the way to unlimited arbitrariness. After all, by following the Pentagon's directions, they can declare that a ship or aircraft dozens of kilometers away is demonstrating hostile intent, considering the ranges at which modern weapons operate. And open fire on it. It's nothing to them, they have the "right!"

The question arises: what does this have to do with the protection of freedom of navigation here? This is nothing but direct encroachment on the freedom of the open sea and approval to make use of weapons and engage in combat operations, not only without the knowledge of the Congress or the President as the chief executive and commander in chief of the U. S. Armed Forces, but even the commander of the task force [soyedineniye]. The imperial ambitions of militarist circles in the United States and their arrogant regard for the norms of international law, which should be obligatory for any civilized state, will lead them too far.

8936

Discussion of U.S. Development of Laser Submarine Communications

18010024a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Oct 87 p 1

[Article by Major A. Ivankov: "Laser Communications"; first paragraph is introduction by Senior Lieutenant V. Anatolev. Passage in italics as published]

[Text] *As US journalists have noted, an effort is underway to develop a system that would permit dependable communication with submarines, even when they are submerged. Could you tell us about this in more detail?*

In one of its issues, the magazine AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY informed its readers about the results of Lockheed Missile and Space Company's efforts to develop laser communications systems for the US Navy's submarines. These systems include land-, sea-, and air-based components linked by radio to satellites. It is on the satellite (ISZ) that the laser is stationed, its beam directed at the submerged submarine and containing information converted from radio signals.

As the magazine stated, the company has a 7.8 million dollar contract for the project, which is expected to be completed in three years. An operating model has already been built. Published materials cite certain data from tests, particularly the fact that the beam can reach a depth of 200 meters.

As the magazine DEFENSE ELECTRONICS stated, communications with submerged US Navy submarines have been based on superlong radio waves. Foreign experts feel that signals at this frequency can reach a depth of 50 meters.

Short and ultrashort wave ranges are also used. But foreign periodicals stress that submarines have to come up to periscope depth and raise a telescopic antenna to be able to receive such signals, and thus risk detection. In their discussion of techniques of transmitting information to submarines, foreign military experts also advert to the potential of already operational communications systems.

Among the problems besides the slow data transmission speed generally associated with submarine communications systems is the considerable size of shore antenna systems and their power supply, a factor which makes them vulnerable to missile strikes. And there is a great chance that a submarine with its antenna up to receive will be detected. All these factors stimulated interest in beginning the search for new laser-based communications systems.

Why lasers? Their development has made it possible to apply various information transmission principles developed for the radio range to the optical range.

All of us are aware that electromagnetic sine wave oscillations can only carry information if they are "irregular." That is, there have to be amplitude surges of greater and lesser magnitude. The amount of information that can be transmitted using the oscillation process is determined by the number of these oscillations per unit of time. In other words, the amount of information transmitted is inversely proportional to the length of the radiation wave. Thus, the laws of physics show that light (a laser beam) can transmit more than a million times more information per unit of time than radio waves in—for example—the one-meter range.

Of course, the US military has been among the first groups of people to be attracted by the indisputable advantages of laser communications. Foreign press reports indicate that in December of 1979 US Air Force experts completed their first series of experiments.

When discussing problems associated with laser communications, foreign experts treat the vulnerability of communications to atmospheric conditions along the signal propagation route as the main weak point. Among such conditions are fog, low clouds, heavy dust, and rain, as well as the visibility changes encountered when a transition is made from one medium to another (such as, for example, into water), where light waves are selectively absorbed or scattered, and the light beams change direction.

As the magazine DEFENSE DAILY reported, experiments have established that laser beam propagation in various optical media depends on the spectrum of the light frequency. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY states that the solution to the problem is to use laser signals in the blue-green part of the spectrum. Such signals can travel through water and permit communication with submarines equipped with sensitive selective-filter receivers.

The newspaper AEROSPACE DAILY writes: "Satellite-based laser communications with submarines is seen as a possible alternative to the very low frequency system. There are definite advantages to it. First, because of the narrowness of the beam, information can be transmitted with a high degree of secrecy. Second, it is resistant to interference. And third, more information (up to 109 bits per second) can be transmitted.

US assistant secretary of defense for command, control, communications, and intelligence Donald Litem said in DEFENSE DAILY: "We have made considerable progress in the area of transmitters and receivers for satellite communication with submerged submarines. We have developed systems using xenon chloride lasers with cesium atomic resonance filters. The system, whose lasers produce in the blue-green part of the spectrum, permits communication with submarines that are at considerable depth and moving at any speed within their capacity."

Nonetheless, not everyone at the Pentagon is this optimistic. Every now and then one hears hints of objections. Certain interested individuals in the US Department of Defense have close ties with the military-industrial complex and see the adoption of satellite-based laser communications systems as a potential threat to contracts for development of very low frequency submarine communications equipment.

Despite the disagreement at the Pentagon, however, the search for new communications systems continues. Representatives of the main firms involved in these systems

stress that they have already done enough basic research and are now ready to begin implementing numerous promising designs from among the many available.

For example, while Lockheed Missiles and Space Company is making progress with its efforts to develop gas lasers, McDonnell Douglas Corporation is working on a Navy contract to make a solid-state laser. According to experts working for the company, more than 10,000 hours of experimental running time will be needed to complete work on the latter laser. Other types of lasers are being developed as well.

According to foreign press accounts, the US Navy is planning to begin development of a comprehensive submarine laser communications system no later than next year, and intends to have it in the initial stage of combat readiness by mid-1990. And to judge from the evidence, no resources will be stinted to achieve this goal. In 1985 alone, the US allocated 26 million dollars for these projects, while in 1986 the figure was over 30 million.

In their statements to the press on this issue, the admirals and generals never tire of maintaining: "Communications and combat unit management systems are the exact areas where we need to achieve superiority over our probable opponent, and the effective use of technology is the way this can be accomplished."

13189

U.S.-Danish Agreement Supposedly Violates Danish Policy

18010030c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Oct 87 p 5

[Article by V. Vinogradov under the rubric "A Rejoinder": "Yet Another 'Unsinkable Aircraft-Carrier?'"

[Text] An agreement recently concluded between the Danish and American air forces could not go unnoticed in Denmark. Under the agreement a group of instructors from the American Air Force will arrive in the nation for a lengthy stay. And this, in the opinion of the democratic public, is nothing other than a violation of the principles underlying the policy of Denmark, which rejects the deployment of foreign troops on the nation's territory in peacetime.

Now, American servicemen will show up in Denmark—even if only for "a lengthy stay." The newspaper LAND OG FOLK states in connection with this that in recent years an increasing number of NATO soldiers have begun coming to Denmark to take part in various maneuvers and exercises conducted there and that American combat aircraft practice operations from Danish airfields for weeks at a time.

An even more serious danger for Denmark, the newspaper rightly believes, is the permission granted to aircraft of the American Air Force to use air bases on the Jutland Peninsula during periods of so-called "crisis situations." Bombs, missiles, spare parts and fuel have already been stockpiled at the air bases for the American squadrons. According to another Danish newspaper, the FRI AKTUELT, NATO has allocated 1 billion kroner for the construction in Jutland of 71 hangers for the deployment of American combat aircraft. This is the largest amount ever allocated by the bloc's command for the development of Denmark's military infrastructure during the entire time the nation has belonged to NATO. Commenting on the developing situation, P. (Voyt), deputy in the Folketing from the Socialist People's Party, warns that through the efforts of the Pentagon and NATO the Jutland Peninsula is being turned into an "unsinkable aircraft-carrier" for American aircraft armed with nuclear weapons.

There is hardly anything more to add.

11499

General Counters French L'EXPRESS on Soviet Militaristic Intent

18010030c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Nov 87 p 3

[Article by Lt Gen Aviation V. Serebryannikov, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor: "Falsification With a Long-Range Objective"]

[Text] The Paris weekly L'EXPRESS has burst forth with a falsification concocted by the familiar anti-Soviet A. Bazanson. It was essentially gross slander against the foreign policy of the USSR. The author announced that the speeches about peace and about new thinking, glasnost and disarmament are designed to deceive public opinion in the West and to provide a screen for militant intentions. Ideas and "literature of a different kind" are encouraged "for internal consumption, for the party leaders and particularly, the military," however. They call for pitting the Western nations against one another, he would have us believe, for preparing for a victorious nuclear war, for inflicting a surprise attack, and so forth.

The author states that he found all of this in two books published in 1986 and 1987 by the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "Voyna i sovremennost'" [War and the contemporary Era] by S.A. Tyushkevich and "Politicheskoye soderzhaniye sovremennykh voyn" [The Political Substance of Contemporary Wars] by Yu.Ya. Kirshin, V.M. Popov and R.A. Savushkin. Bazanson tries to pass both books off as a "methodological program of preparations for a third world war." "Actual Soviet diplomatic activities," he asserts, "fit into this program."

"The more incredible the lie, the more quickly people believe it," Goebbels taught us. Nor is his formula shunned today in the West by those who do not accept the new thinking and still dream of getting even with socialism.

I am very familiar with the books mentioned by Bazanson. They do not contain even a hint of the wild ideas which he attributes to them. General S.A. Tyushkevich, for example, underscores the fact that "a society which is working out creative plans extending to the next millennium cannot even think about war. It is oriented undeviatingly and for the long term toward peaceful labor. It resolutely rejects the use of force in relations with other states and advocates the establishment of the principles of peace and extensive cooperation among peoples based on equality and universal security."

Both in the international arena and within the nation Soviet policy is one in its consistent defense of peace and in its struggle to prevent a new war. The books mentioned steadfastly develop the idea that in the nuclear missile era war cannot be an acceptable or prudent, and especially not an expedient means of achieving any sort of political objectives. And it was not simply happenstance that the USSR has committed itself never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The idea of the inadmissibility of war is the main element in Soviet military policy and its defensive military doctrine. All of the defense activities of the Soviet State and its Armed Forces are subordinated to this. The peaceful motives were incorporated in 27th CPSU Congress materials and in our nation's new initiatives aimed at reducing the level of military confrontation and achieving nuclear disarmament. A world without war is the ideal of socialism, V.I. Lenin said, and this is underscored in the new edition of the CPSU Program.

Bazanson is not unique. Like other anti-Soviets, he first attributes to Soviet scientists an absurd and falsified interpretation of V.I. Lenin's concepts and CPSU policy, and then "exposes" his own falsifications. V.I. Lenin resolutely rejected the idea of spreading socialism by means of "revolutionary wars," considering them to be a total departure from Marxism. Today's communists are also firmly convinced that the inciting of revolution from outside, particularly by military means, is fruitless and inadmissible. Revolutions come to fruition as a result of the internal development of nations in which exploitative orders reign.

Naturally, the books by our authors develop the idea that the USSR's love of peace is combined with a readiness to issue the firmest and most decisive rebuff to any aggressor. Bazanson cunningly asserts that "no one is contemplating" attacking our homeland. As though there had never been the 1918-1920 campaign by the capitalist nations against the newly born, first Soviet Republic, the fascist invasion, numerous acts of provocation, and so

forth. How could we forget the Pentagon's plans for nuclear attacks against the USSR? We are not the kind to bear a grudge, but we also do not suffer from historical "sclerosis."

The falsification in the magazine L'EXPRESS had a long-range aim. It is aimed at belittling the significance of the USSR's peace-loving initiatives. The author's intention was to contribute his mite to the row raised by those who want to prevent the achievement of agreements between the USSR and the USA on the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. What is more, how, if not with anti-Soviet slander, could one try to justify the stepped-up militaristic activities in France and the other NATO nations or their striving "to compensate for" the American Pershing II and Cruise missiles which are subject to destruction under the Soviet-American treaty being prepared?

11499

Nikanorov Commentary on Franco-German Military Cooperation

18010014b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Sep 87 p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanorov under the rubric "Military-Political Commentary": "A 'Sparrow' With a Nuclear Beak"]

[Text] Is a hybrid between a rooster and an eagle possible? Not likely in nature, notwithstanding the intoxicating success of modern genetic engineering. But in the field of military policy, it turns out, some "ornithologists" of the military kind who are trying hard to cross the French cock and the West German eagle seek to bring this about on the banks of the Seine and the Rhine.

The result of these efforts is the "bold sparrow"—this is roughly how the designation of the large-scale West German-French "(Kekker) Spatz" maneuvers can be translated. They are taking place in the West German lander of Bavaria and Baden-Wurttemberg with the participation of 55,000 Bundeswehr servicemen and 20,000 servicemen in the French "rapid deployment forces."

The present maneuvers hold a special place in the development of military collaboration between Bonn and Paris. Let us remember that this collaboration began to be developed with much greater activity after February last year, when a joint statement on military problems by FRG Chancellor H. Kohl and French President Mitterand was published. "Relations between the two countries in the military field will henceforth be of the same nature as those between Bonn and Washington," the newspaper LE MONDE writes. According to the press, France and the FRG have made arrangements for "operational collaboration" between their armed forces, for "continued analysis to determine the best use of French forces in the FRG," and the "rapid deployment

forces" in particular. In addition to this, LE MONDE reported, the French president has stated that he is "prepared to consult with the chancellor on the possible use of strategic [dostrategicheskoye] weapons on German territory."

A new aspect of policy in the defense field also showed up in the course of the "(Kekker) Spatz" maneuvers: in the event of war, the French will no longer consider the FRG as its forward defense area as they did before, and they are now prepared to enter combat in advanced positions. This really would mean the appearance of French Pluton nuclear missiles (range of fire up to 120 kilometers) in FRG territory for the purpose of a nuclear strike "farther east than German territory." Thus the Austrian newspaper OSTERREICHISCHE NACHRICHTEN wrote with alarm that "the French nuclear umbrella will be opened over a Germany free of American missiles in the future. As a result we will be on the brink of destruction and in the nuclear sights."

It is characteristic that the plan for the "(Kekker) Spatz" exercises also provides for a "nuclear strike" on the very territory of a neutral state designated as a certain "green country." It is not difficult to decipher this cryptonym. The Austrian public is indignant that the nuclear beak of the "bold sparrow" has been aimed at their country. Meanwhile, plans exist for turning this beak into an even more threatening weapon. Not long ago two former French defense ministers, C. (Ernieux) and P. Messmer, proposed that French neutron weapons, which would be "under the joint control of Paris and Bonn," be stationed in FRG territory. This proposal is in keeping with the aspirations of those circles on the Rhine who do not like the proposed elimination of American and Soviet intermediate range missiles and operational-tactical missiles.

The symptoms of the Franco-West German nuclear rapprochement are a very dangerous sign. Attempts to wreck or complicate a forthcoming agreement within the framework of the "double zero solution" can be clearly read behind them. The West German press agency DPA noted reasonably in this connection that the Warsaw Pact "will not be likely to consider placement of the French Hades missiles, armed with neutron warheads and with a range of 350 kilometers, to be nuclear disarmament following withdrawal of Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles from territory in southwestern Germany." Indeed, a predatory "sparrow" cannot be passed off in any way as a dove of peace.

8936

Inspectors Observe FRG Military Activities

18010030b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Oct 87 p 3

[Article: "On the Conduct of an Inspection on the Territory of the Federal Republic of Germany in Accordance With the Stockholm Accords"]

[Text] Under the provisions in the document coming out of the Stockholm Conference on Measures to Strengthen Trust and Security and on Disarmament in Europe, the

government of the USSR on 26 October of this year requested permission from the government of the FRG for an inspection of military activities conducted on the latter's territory.

Upon receiving a positive response to the request, a group of Soviet military inspectors arrived in the FRG on 28 October 1987 and began the inspection.

11499

Polish Ships Visit Tallin

18010030a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Oct 87 p 3

[Article: "A Visit by Polish Ships"]

[Text] Under an agreement a group of Polish warships consisting of the training ship *Vodnik* and two landing ships will repay an official, friendly call at the Port of Tallin during the period 1-5 November. Rear Admiral P. Kolodzeychik, Commander of the Polish Navy, will head the group making the call.

11499

Japan's Defense White Paper Said To Justify Buildup

18010014a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Sep 87 p 3

[Article by Colonel V. Rodin: "What the White Paper Revealed"]

[Text] A so-called "White Paper on Defense Matters," which sets forth the official views of the Japanese leadership on policy matters in the military field, has been published after the cabinet's approval every year since 1976 on the eve of the anniversary of Japan's defeat in the war. The book made its appearance this year as well.

The first thing that attracts one's attention is the crude misrepresentation of Soviet foreign policy, which the authors of this edition deliberately put across in distorted form. By making use of the theme of "the increased Soviet threat," which has already become traditional in Japanese propaganda, they attempt to lay responsibility on the Soviet Union for the arms race and continued tension in the world and in the Far East. At the same time, all the initiatives by the Soviet state aimed at reducing nuclear and conventional weapons are either hushed up or presented as propaganda tricks. And in that way they juggle the conclusion that "the West and Japan need to build up their conventional as well as nuclear containment potential in every possible way" and to step up their joint military preparations.

The white paper devotes considerable space to an assessment of the status of relations in the Japan-U.S. alliance, which are becoming more and more involved with diverse plans and extended with new subjects, the

authors emphasize. Thus, completion of the draft of the operational plan for combined operations by the armed forces of Japan and the United States in the event of war in the Far East at the end of 1984 and the first arrangements reached in September 1986 for the transfer of Japanese military technology to the United States, as well as the inclusion of Japan in research for the American "Star Wars" program, are considered "an important step in intensifying bilateral military collaboration."

According to information in the white paper, nearly 50,000 American servicemen are continuously stationed on the Japanese islands. The U. S. Armed Forces make use of about 120 military installations in Japan, including 10 airfields, up to 20 training grounds, and over 25 depots for weapons, ammunition, and GSM [fuel and lubricants]. The carrier strike group led by the aircraft carrier *Midway* is assigned to the Japanese naval base at Yokosuka (35 kilometers south of Tokyo) and the country's ports are being used regularly by American naval vessels. Deployment of 50 F-16 aircraft has been completed at the Misawa airbase in northern Japan; together with the Japanese VVS [armed forces], they have begun to work out training tasks to carry out strikes against ground targets, which obviously means targets in the Soviet Far East. Of course, in portraying these facts as "retaliatory actions," the authors of the white paper deliberately pass over the fact that the American naval vessels which visit Japanese bases and ports, including the carrier *Midway*, carry nuclear weapons with a total yield hundreds of times higher than the American bombs which incinerated Hiroshima and Nagasaki 42 years ago. The fact that the American F-16 fighters carry nuclear weapons cannot be found in the white paper, either. At the same time, disregarding these and other irrefutable facts, the authors have not forgotten to stress that the Japanese Government "adheres to the three nuclear-free principles."

Then the white paper authors, stressing the necessity for developing military collaboration with the United States, come out at the same time for a further increase in Japan's role within the Japanese-American military alliance, extension of the area of responsibility for the Japanese armed forces, and their provision with qualitatively new types of weapons and technical equipment. In particular, the objective of providing for effective PVO [air defense] up to several hundred miles from the Japanese islands is being promoted for the national armed forces. For this it is considered necessary to arm them with over-the-horizon radar, aircraft with the AWACS system, and refueling aircraft, as well as to attach naval vessels for carrying out air defense missions.

In revealing the Japanese militarists' future plans, the authors report the intention of Japan's national defense headquarters to set up a special group of armed forces in the region of Hokkaido to carry out combat operations in a northern direction.

The white paper provides evidence that the Japanese leadership is consistently pursuing a policy of gradually abolishing any restrictions whatever on building up the national armed forces. In 1987 the military budget exceeded the limit of 1 percent of the GNP for the first time in the past decade, and as the book emphasizes, this policy will be continued in the future as well. A commission to prepare a reform of the armed forces, planned to be put into effect after 1991, has been working at the national defense headquarters since 1985. As reported in the Japanese press, it has not been ruled out that the manpower and combat strength of Japan's armed forces may be substantially increased as the result of such reform.

In this connection, the white paper's authors raise a question at their own initiative which the representatives of countries in Southeast Asia, and lately China as well, have been asking the Japanese leadership more and more

insistently: "But isn't Japan seeking to become a major military power?"— And they hasten to respond in the negative. But it is appropriate to quote the U. S. secretary of defense here. "The following must be kept in mind in assessing Japan's contribution to the joint defense," C. Weinberger stated recently. "Japan's military expenditures have risen from 12 billion dollars in 1983 to 23 billion dollars in 1987. There are twice as many destroyers and three times as many PLO [antisubmarine] aircraft in Japan's armed forces as in the U. S. 7th Fleet, and as many air defense fighters as we have for the continental United States; Japan holds fourth place among NATO countries, after the United States, Great Britain and France, in tonnage of major ships. Japan directly supplements the activity of NATO countries." It is hard to add anything to the assessment by the chief of the American war department.

8936

Public Meeting in Tajikistan With Veterans of Afghan War

18010104a [Editorial Report] Dushanbe TOJIKISTONI SOVETI in Tajik 8 July 1987 carries on page 4, under the rubric, "We Are Internationalists," a 700-word article, "Sons of Man Are Members One Another..." ("Bani odam a'zoi yakdigarand..."), by T. Turdiyev and Yu. Tuydiyev. The article is subtitled, "Resolutions From a Meeting With Militant Internationalists in Pendzhikent Rayon." (An Introduction to the article states that tens of youths from Pendzhikent have served in Afghanistan. A while ago they gathered in the city's park.) The first meeting has taken place between members of the Pendzhikent gorkom's bureau and militant internationalists. Other participants included veterans of war and labor, administrators, responsible workers of the Leninabad obkom (S. Homidov, R. Yuldoshov) the head of the Pendzhikent city ispolkom (A. Jobborov) and head of the gorkom's organization department, as well as many urban and rural youths.

The gorkom first secretary, J. Homidov, discussed the difficult task performed by those who did their internationalist duty in Afghanistan. They now participate in the military-patriotic training of the young. The assembled observed a minute of silence for those who had died in Afghanistan (Suyun Aliqulov, Kuchmurod Turonov, Maqsatullo Sohbov, Abdullo Aliyev, and Abdullo Sadriddinov.) N. Saidov, head of the city's council of veterans of war and labor noted that tens of youths had been awarded military decorations. Nizomiddin Rahmonov, head of the council of the militant internationalists' club of the city Komsomol committee and responsible secretary of the city's Znanie Society, stated that this is the second year of operation for the militant internationalists' club. Its members are youths from the city and villages of the rayon who served in Afghanistan. This year they participated in 25 activities.

Qamariddin Boboyev, a middle school Russian teacher, stated that every year tens of young men from the city and villages of the rayon are called to serve the fatherland. Some of them are physically weak and, what is worse, do not know Russian. When they serve in Afghanistan, their ignorance of Russian causes them difficulties. The teaching of Russian in the rayon's schools must be improved. Murodullo Qodirov, head of the department of education, stated that Russian-language instruction in the rayon's schools is poor. Until the 1980s, many teachers came from the RSFSR to work in the rayon's schools; they used only Russian in class. Now some teachers use Tajik as well as Russian in class. Tens of teachers who are not specialists in the Russian language teach in the rayon's schools.

Yusuf Narziyev, a middle school teacher, said, "Not every militant internationalist is welcomed after his service. Very few of them are admitted into the ranks of the party."

/06662

Tajik Soldiers in Afghanistan

18010104b [Editorial Report] Dushanbe TOJIKISTONI SOVETI in Tajik 14 August 1987 carries on page 3, under the rubric, "We Are Internationalists," a 500-word article, "Feeling of Courage" ("Ehsosi dilovari"), by H. Kiromov. Two years ago, Kiromov was a Soviet soldier serving in Afghanistan. When Kiromov served in Afghanistan he ran into an acquaintance from Tajikistan State University, Homid Saidov. Kiromov depicts Saidov's courage under fire and his popularity among the Afghans, whom he helped in various ways (saving a child's life, helping to fight the enemy, etc.) Saidov was awarded the order, "For Service to the Fatherland." He is now employed in his favorite occupation, working in the "kafedra" of scientific communism at Tajikistan State University.

/06662

Tajik Veteran of Afghan War

18010104c [Editorial Report] Dushanbe TOJIKISTONI SOVETI in Tajik 17 August 1987 carries on page 2, under the rubric, "We Are Internationalists," a 500-word article, "One Heroic Moment" ("Yak Lahzai qahramoni"), by J. Yusufov. The article is about Komil Nurulloyev, a Komsomol member who served with the Soviet Army in Afghanistan, and his leadership of Soviet and Afghan troops in successful fighting for control of an Afghan mountain village. The ethnic composition of this Soviet unit is described as three Tajiks (Nurulloyev and two others), one Chechen, one Russian, "and others." After Nurulloyev completed his military service he returned to his birthplace, a kolkhoz in Matchinskiy rayon. His two years of military service made him physically strong. The experience of the military and battle changed his character as well; now he is not a "frivolous boy" and thinks before he speaks.

The quality of physical education and primary military training need to be improved greatly. Most draftees have not done rigorous gymnastics from an early age. Once in the army they unfairly complain about having a rough time. Most important of all is daily sports activity for the young.

/06662

**Methods, Reforms Meet Some Resistance,
Skepticism**

18010017a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Sep 87 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel A. Ivanov, Doctor of Economic Sciences: "Looking for New Forms"]

[Text] The students arrived at the tactical seminar exercise sufficiently prepared after having conscientiously studied all of the recommended literature. Nonetheless the first question that instructor Candidate of Military Sciences N. Badyakin asked stymied the students. The answer to the question was not in any of the recommended student texts. The problem situation, one that had been prepared by the military instructor, seemed unsolvable. But the problem gradually became clearer, the tactical situation became more concrete and initial hypotheses were proposed. And the students began to show more and more activity, relying on the knowledge that they had previously acquired. They proposed various possible solutions and argued in their defense. A heated discussion began and unexpected solutions began emerged. Finally, through the common search they found the most effective and best solution that solved the problem situation.

After the seminar the instructors who had attended it heatedly shared their opinions and many came to the same conclusion: we military instructors lose a lot when we use the traditional training method and have only one goal, albeit an important one — getting the students to comprehensively and qualitatively master the knowledge in our subject area — and in doing this we only imply that graduates begin to apply this knowledge that they gain later, during practical exercises and especially while in their future service in the forces. The seminar visually displayed another method — the application of theory to solve specific tactical tasks. And what is even more important is that the experience convinced the students that battle and its organization and conduct is more than just individual combat with weapons and equipment; it is also combat between the commanders' minds, will and knowledge. The cadets need creativity and the best mental work to achieve victory.

I have good reason for going into such great detail about this recent seminar. Colonel Badyakin is one of the first instructors in our Academy imeni M. V. Frunze to begin to make extensive use of the active method of teaching in his teaching activities. Many instructors have visited his exercises and many have begun to change their opinions of their activities and to master methods that are new to them. The academy now has a permanent methodological seminar whose goal is to orient instructors on military school problems and assist them in mastering the foremost teaching methods and devices. The seminar is chaired by Professor, Deputy Academy Chief and Doctor of Military Sciences Lieutenant General V. Reznichenko

A large group of our young instructors are also improving their methodological preparation by using the new teaching methods and forms in the departments that Minvuz [the Ministry of Higher Education] set up at the Polytechnical Museum. Progressive teaching methods are being systematized in academic publications which already make up a rather impressive special "Pedagogical Knowledge" library which, by the way, is very popular not only among instructors, but students as well.

One would think that the process for improving the training process that has been selected is very futuristic and allows us to solve the tasks of restructuring military schools very well. The leadership and the academy's training council share this position, but there are others, to include those with a lot of practical experience, who are of the opposite opinion. They do not take part in the seminar's work, are skeptical about the new method that the others are attempting and watch calmly and without interest from the sidelines. The conviction that "I have led exercises for a decade; am I now to throw this experience aside, become an innovator and restructure my teaching anew?" certainly had a strong impact on this thinking. When a leader such as a department head, for example, confesses these convictions, the other instructors in the department will not look for innovations. And this is why there are times when the process of restructuring pedagogical thinking is slow and new teaching methods are not implemented in as short time as is required by the business at hand.

And there is one more important thing here. Exercise preparations using the problem method require more thinking and methodological searching from the instructor and it also requires more time. A minute of exercise actually means hours of work. An instructor becomes a sort of discoverer at each new subject in a program. He "plays out" dozens of problems until he has selected the most interesting and instructive one; he must prepare arguments and counterarguments and review all possible turns in the future discussion so that he completely masters the situation and holds the students thought processes on the required course. He has to prepare for many things and the process is long and agonizing. But in leading an exercises, even if it goes extremely well and the students remember it for a long time (and this does happen), there is the possibility that the instructor will not be evaluated any better than his colleagues who used the traditional method in the exercise. There are more chances of just the opposite happening and the chiefs who are responsible for monitoring the methodological process attending the former instructor's exercise and finding something objectionable.

What happens in real life? On the one hand, instructors' work is oriented on finding and using the new teaching methods which, I repeat, best promote the development of active thinking in students and bring theory close to reality. On the other hand, the methods themselves are not important. The primary thing is that the instructor correctly and thoroughly illuminates the issue being studied.

And now there is one more thing to cover. Traditionally the instructor, as a pedagogue, is evaluated by pedagogues themselves, by colleagues and by chiefs, and their evaluation is decisive. But I am deeply convinced that we must also consider the opinions of the students during reconstruction. Because we fear for our authority we do not try to use even questionnaires to find out from our students how we are teaching them and whether our exercises are of benefit to them or not. I am not sure that if this were done, some of us would get a "two" instead of a "three" in methodology. What more reason do we need to think over our activities and shake up our methodological arsenal?

But let me return to the active teaching methods. There are still things that are questionable and unclear about their use. For example, what exercises require us to

create problem situations and set up scientific disputes? How much time should we spend on this and how much on using conventional methods to put out training material? And here is another question. What are the criteria that we should use as the basis for evaluating a student — his answer to the assigned question or whether he used the creative method and solved the problem? This is why it is very important for us to establish closer contacts among VUZ's [institutes of higher education] and to exchange experiences. We cannot allow the search for innovation in academies and schools to be uncoordinated and to be done without considering the experiences of the other institutions.

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